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GOOGLE SEARCH AND THE LAW ON 
DOMINANCE IN THE EU. 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPATIBILITY OF CURRENT 





Business platforms that utilise, or are based upon, internet technology are omnipresent in consumers 
daily lives. Since the dawn of the World Wide Web, the amount of web content has increased 
greatly. Simultaneously, business interests have sparked, meeting the arisen demand for particular 
online services. As a consequence, economists have defined a novel market in these sectors, namely 
that of multi-sided platform markets. To an important extent, these markets experience network 
effects, which can strengthen a platform operator’s position in relation to competitors. In turn, 
competition authorities have witnessed various dominant undertakings emerging. The focus of this 
article is on one particular internet sector, to wit, that of World Wide Web Search, and on one firm in 
particular, Google Incorporated. It critically analyses how the Google Search algorithms are shaped 
from a technological perspective, how these are or can be categorised in accordance with the 
economic theory of multi-sided platform markets, and how these perform under current dominance 
law analysis in the European Union, more specifically Art. 102 TFEU. To that end, it will also take 
into account the recent Google Commitments procedure by the European Commission. 
Keywords 
INTERNET SEARCH; DOMINANCE; ARTICLE 102 TFEU; MULTI-SIDED PLATFORM MARKETS; NETWORK 
EFFECTS; COMMITMENTS. 
I.  Introduction 
The gap between quickly developing technology, economic theories and the legal frameworks 
regulating both phaenomena seems to be wider than ever. It is an issue that technology nowadays 
takes such leaps forwards, that competition rules and methodologies appear to be incapable of 
regulating the business practices surrounding it. Whereas recent economic theories envelop the 
markets on which these technologies are employed, competition law authorities, however, still seem 
to struggle with them. A prominent example can be found in the field of search engine technology, 
and more specifically with the Google Search algorithms. As this article demonstrates, the law on 
dominance in EU competition law is currently insufficiently equipped for dealing with this fast-
pacing field of business life. 
Google Incorporated has become one of the most popular brands of today over the last 15 years.
2
 
What is more, its search services are the most well-known as regards online search technology. 
Nevertheless, by cause of the recent commitments procedure, it appears to have been brought to its 
knees by various competition law agencies across the world. As such, Google Incorporated and its 
                                                 
1
 Lecturer of Economic and European Law at the University of Groningen, Netherlands. This article is an abridged and 
updated version of the author’s homonymic LL.M. Thesis. It forms part of the research programme Protecting 
European Citizens and Market Participants of the Groningen Centre for Law and Governance. The author owes his 
deep gratitude to his research and thesis supervisor, prof. dr. Hans Vedder, for his patience in reading, his insightful 
comments and inspiring discussions. 
2
 Hereafter, Google Incorporated will be described either as “Google”, as “Google Inc.”, as “the company”, or as “the 
firm”. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2497932 
2 
 
Google Search engine will be scrutinized from a technological, economic and legal perspective, so as 
to provide for a comprehensive insight in this triad of fields.  
In this endeavour, this article explores and utilizes various resources in order to gain a proper 
understanding of this field of technology. Aside of the literature itself, several graphical 
representations of the scope of the internet are incorporated, as well as tables and diagrams, 
exemplifying the explained concepts. The data leading to these figures has been gathered from 
internet-based sources, economic or competition law related literature, or from the relevant company 
policy web pages. 
II.  Google’s Search Technology. 
II.1. A short history of the Internet. 
Since the construction of the ARPANET,
3
 and since the development of super- as well as personal 
computers, which has its basis in the 1950s, more and more computers, and people have become 
mutually connected, enabling intra-continental information sharing.
4
 What started as the need for a 
decentralized network for nuclear weaponry, soon evolved into a demilitarized and fully privatized 
network of mutually communicating routers, networks and numerous other computing devices, 
receiving the name the Internet.
5
 As the technology and the manner in which it developed showed 
potential, large investments were made that allowed more devices to connect, more data to be 
transferred from one place on the grid to the other, and enabled the possibility to privatize the entire 
grid from government control. 
Consequently, in the early 1990s, in Switzerland, information-sharing software was developed, 
based on a code called HyperText Markup Language (HTML) and the Hyper Text Transfer Protocol 
(HTTP).
6
 Again, even though initially not intended for widespread public use, the applicability of the 
software became immensely popular, which led to the emergence of the World Wide Web. Both 
developments resulted in a staggering increase in the number of servers, as well as the amount of 




                                                 
3
 J. Ryan, A History of the Internet and the Digital Future, London, Reaktion Books Ltd. 2010, p. 11 ff; W. Stuart, 
“Internet History - One Page Summary”, latest update on 29 April 2009, available online at 
<livinginternet.com/i/ii_summary.htm> (accessed 18 September 2014). 
4
 Encyclopædia Britannica, entry on “the Internet”, last modified on 15 June 2013, p.1, available online at 
<britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/291494/Internet> (accessed 18 September 2014). 
5
 Federal Networking Council, “FNC Resolution: Definition of ‘Internet’”, US NITR Development Program website, 
24 October 1995, <nitrd.gov/fnc/Internet_res.aspx> (accessed 18 September 2014) 
6
 T. Berners-Lee, Weaving the Web. The original Design and Ultimate Destiny of the World Wide Web, New York, 
Harper Business 2000, p. 59-60. 
7
 Data was derived from Netcraft’s Web Server Survey, available online at <news.netcraft.com/archives/category/web-
server-survey>, The Internet Systems Consortium’s Domain Survey Host Count, available online at 
<isc.org/services/survey>, and R.H. Zakon, “Hobbes Internet timeline”, available online at 




Diagram 1. Number of Hosts since the Dawn of the Internet 










































































































































Regarding this immense growth of information on the WWW and of the number of physical 
internet connections, it is evident that demand also rose for ancillary services such as the indexation 
and organization of this content. Ergo, shortly after its creation, the World Wide Web became the 
cradle of indexing and search service providers. Of these, Google Inc. was not the first; various 
indexing services existed before Google jumped on the bandwagon in 1998-’99.8  
Original search engines assigned importance to pages on the basis of the entered query. The more 
often (parts of) a query would coincide with words on a webpage, the more important that page was 
regarded, and the more likely it would become the first hit. Whereas over the last 15 years, Google’s 
service has evolved, in its prime years it mainly revolved around a search indexing algorithm that 
substantially different from existing engines.
9
 Page & Brin’s invention namely employed a different 
approach to assigning importance.
10
 The patent of 2001 stipulates it as follows: 
“A method assigns importance ranks to nodes in a linked database, such as any 
database of documents containing citations, the World Wide Web or any other 
hypermedia database. The rank assigned to a document is calculated from the ranks of 
documents citing it. In addition, the rank of a document is calculated from a constant 
representing the probability that a browser through the database will randomly jump to 
the document. The method is particularly useful in enhancing the performance of search 
engine results for hypermedia databases, such as the World Wide Web, whose documents 
have a large variation in quality.”11 
II.2. Crawling, indexing, categorising and ranking. 
The services generally consist of crawlers or spiderbots, which are pieces of software programmed 
to scour a predetermined set of webpages for hyperlinks to other webpages, which are scanned for 
new hyperlinks. Two types exist, horizontal or general crawling, and vertical or specified crawling, 
such as only websites relating to sports, to news, or to books. Later in the process, separate search 
services can be distinguished, therefore defined as horizontal and vertical search services 
respectively.
12
 After having collected the strings of hyperlinks, the crawling software will report 
back to the main server. 
Consecutively, the strings of links are stocked in indexing servers. Also, the crawled info is stored 
and indexed in a cache server, distributed amongst several categories. Different categories are re-
crawled in a different fashion and rate; the prime example for this is an online news service with 




                                                 
8
 T. Seymour, D. Frantsvog & S. Kumar, “History Of Search Engines”, International Journal of Management & 
Information Systems, vol. 15, ed. 4, 2011.  
9
 An algorithm is a concept in computing science that entails a formula or set of rules to mathematically solve 
equations or other issues. In search, such algorithms are effectuated in order to find the most relevant item amongst a 
large number of items. 
10
 E.g. K.L. Devine, “Preserving Competition: in Multi-Sided Innovative Markets: How do You Solve a Problem like 
Google?”, N.C.J.L. & Tech., vol. 10, ed. 1, pp 59-118, p. 66. Organic search results are also referred to as editorial or 
algorithmic search results, J. Battelle, The Search. How Google and Its Rivals Rewrote the Rules of Business and 
Transformed Our Culture, London, Nicholas Breakley Publishing, 2005, p. 117.  
11
 L. Page, “Method for node ranking in a linked database”, Patent nr. 6,285,999, filed on 9 January 1998, 
awarded on 4 September 2001, available online at <patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF
&d=PALL&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=6285999.PN.&OS=PN/6285999
&RS=PN/6285999> (accessed 18 September 2014). PageRank is an algorithm, a formula or process that allows to 
solve various issues, be they mathematical, purely hypothetical or actual.  
12
  See further, infra, par. IV.3.4.6. 
13
 Allegedly, it was due to 11 September 2001, when searchers could not find anything on the terrorist attacks, because 
Google had indexed the particular web pages quite some time before that; see Google, “The Evolution of Search”, 
Youtube video, 27 November 2011, available online at <youtu.be/mTBShTwCnD4> (accessed 18 September 2014). 
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The patented PageRank algorithm accomplishes its task in the process that follows, which is the 
ordering and ranking of search results, after a search term, or query, has been entered into the 
engine.
14
 Still, even though Google Search originally distinguished itself by this patented piece of 
technology, the PageRank algorithm is but one of the over 200 algorithms and factors to produce the 
most germane and appropriate outcomes to a query on Google Search.
15
 
Hence, in short, Google indexes and caches the Web, and ranks its results. However, in the search 
engine, other relevant algorithms are employed to personalize search results. First, browser cookies 
are used for documenting preferences, such as blocking adult content or the display language, but 
also for assessing on which search results individual searchers actually clicked.
16
 Consequently, 
cookies mirror or portray the searching behaviour of browsing individuals. And for Google, that is 
relevant, as cookies provide for preferred search options and for the possibility of pinpointing 
relevant advertising to customers; in short, they optimise the browsing experience. 
Secondly, server logs of every entered query are made, which also gather information on the 
utilized browser, on the requesting IP address, and on the cookies connected to the query.
17
 
Considering that the IP address acts largely as a street address, due to its geographical distribution, 
every query can be assigned to a geographic location or region. Hence, aggregated data concerning 
the server logs can identify what was searched by which IP addresses.
18
 Furthermore, by means of 
the click-through-rate, it can easily be verified which queries deliver the most clicks on ads.
19
 
Thirdly, by logging in to a specific Google account, it allows the firm to aggregate more personal 
searching data of users and generate search results on the basis of that.
20
 For all the accounts of other 
“Google” products, the company recently unified all its privacy policies, resulting in one database for 
all services in which all queries and other personalizing information is stored and utilized for 
providing for a personalized browsing experience.
21
  
                                                 
14
 S. Brin & L. Page, “The Anatomy of a Large-scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine”, Computer Networks and ISDN 
Systems, vol. 30, 1998, 107-117, p. 109-110. 
15
 Google’s Inside Search, “How Search Works. From Algorithms to Answers”, available online at 
<google.com/intl/en/insidesearch/howsearchworks/thestory> (accessed 18 September 2014) 
16
 Browser cookies are small text files which are placed by the server on the individual’s computer or browser folder, 
containing a string of characters that allows the website to recognise the browsing software when it enters the 
website. Depending on the type, different information is transferred. See for a list of the cookies that Google uses 
Google Inc., “Types of cookies used by Google”, available online at <google.com/policies/technologies/types/ > 
(accessed 18 September 2014). 
17
 IP can be seen as the street address on the internet. Every routing device is assigned a specific IP address. As these 
are managed and distributed on a global scale, the IP address of every router is uniquely discernible. Moreover, large, 
so-called “blocks” of IP are distributed and redistributed geographically, enabling location by IP. For more 
information, see e.g. RIPE NCC Database, “Understanding IP Addressing”, available online at 
<www.ripe.net/internet-coordination/press-centre/understanding-ip-addressing> (accessed 18 September 2014). 
18
 K. Owen, “The power of where: using IP geolocation to create instant local connections online”, Econsultancy.com, 
25 September 2012, available online at <econsultancy.com/nl/blog/10761-the-power-of-where-using-ip-geolocation-
to-create-instant-local-connections-online> (accessed 18 September 2014). 
19
 The click through rate or CTR is the ratio between the number of clicks on and the number of impressions/displays of 
the advertisement. A high click ratio on a specific ad will mean that more clicks are delivered compared to a 
relatively small number of displays. 
20
 Furthermore, Google offers a “suite of Google applications”, such as Google Calendar, Mail, Drive and Docs, to be 
provided on the domain of an enterprise or institution, see G. Phelan, “10 top Dutch universities adopt Google Apps 
for Education”, Google Enterprise blog entry, 15 June 2012, available online at 
<googleenterprise.blogspot.nl/2012/06/10-top-dutch-universities-adopt-google.html> (accessed 18 September 2014). 
(accessed 18 September 2014). 
21
 See also R. Livne, “Just ask Google for your flights, reservations, package delivery info and more”, 14 August 2013, 
Google Blog entry, available online at <googleblog.blogspot.ca/2013/08/just-ask-google-for-your-flights.html> 




As established above, any consumer with a computer and an internet connection is able to browse to 
Google’s search engine website, and to search through the enormous index of pages and other web 
content, thus benefiting from Google’s service, without having to pay.22 The question then is how 
Google generates revenue from these services. The central word in this sense, is advertising, most 
notably in the form of two advertising services, Adwords and Adsense. 
In the primitive years after having been launched as search engine, in October 2000, Google 
introduced its advertising service, Adwords.
23
 It came in two strands: on the one hand, vacant 
advertisements at the top of the page could be bought for a fixed price per impression (displays of the 
ad) set by Google, called Adwords Premium; on the other hand, advertisements next to the search 
results could be bought through a generalised second-price auctioned system, known as Adwords 
Select.
24
 The latter was based not on costs per impression, but on costs-per-click, or CPC, by 
customers. Fundamental to either service is that advertisers bid on vacant slots visible near the results 
for specific or broader queries. Moreover, nowadays, the AdWords mechanism is mainly focused on 




Auctions are run as soon as a query is entered, and all ad slots near results are filled 
instantaneously; furthermore, a ranking algorithm, based on the bid as well as the quality of the ad, 
determines the location of the advertisement. Google advertises this system as being the perfect 
medium for both SME’s and larger corporations to advertise on Google, as in this way larger 
corporations can focus on broader search terms and smaller enterprises will choose for more 
specialised search terms, fit to their niche products or services.
26
 Also, because of a multitude of 
factors, auctions between competitors differ: e.g. the query entered, the selected words to which a 
competitor would like its ads to be displayed, the relevance or quality of the ad to the query entered 
(determined by Google’s algorithms), the height of the bids, or the number of competitors at that 
moment make the ad market quite competitive. 
The other large advertising service that Google is dependent on is based on websites that are 
associated with Google, and is called AdSense. It operates by placing relevant Google 
advertisements on websites administrated by third parties. Any private person having a website can 
reserve special portions of the website for Google’s advertising purposes. For third parties, this also 
has a financial benefit: for every X number of advertisements displayed or clicked, the proprietor of 
the site gathers revenue from Google.
27
 The administrator can choose the search terms with which it 
                                                 
22
 The economic and legal consequences of this will be covered in the following chapters. 
23
 K. Vogel & C. McCaffrey, “Google Launches Self-Service Advertising Program”, Googlepress Blogspot entry, 23 
October 2000, available online at <googlepress.blogspot.nl/2000/10/google-launches-self-service.html> (accessed 18 
September 2014). See also S. Levy, “Secret of Googlenomics: Data-Fueled Recipe Brews Profitability”, Wired 
Magazine, 22 May 2009, available online at <wired.com/culture/culturereviews/magazine/17-
06/nep_googlenomics?currentPage=all> (accessed 18 September 2014). 
24
 S. Levy, In the Plex. How Google thinks, works, and shapes our lives, New York, Simon and Schuster, 2011, p. 89 & 
109. 
25
 More specifically, in III.3.5. 
26
 And it has ostensibly been very profitable, see the financial data on 
<investor.google.com/financial/tables.html> and <investor.google.com/earnings/2013/Q2_google_earnings.html> 
(accessed 18 September 2014). 
27
 See also H.R. Varian, “Online Ad Auctions”, American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 2009, 99:2, 430–
434. In this article research, multiple references are made to the work of Varian; nevertheless, for all clarity, it should 
be revealed that from 2002, he has been employed by Google as the Chief Economist, see, e.g., Google Ventures, 
“Hal Varian. Advisor to Google Ventures”, profile entry, available online at <googleventures.com/team/hal-varian> 
(accessed 18 September 2014). 
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associates the content the most; consequently, as is the same as with Adwords, after auctions are run, 
only the most relevant advertisements will be displayed on the pages.
28
 
What is evident from these explanations is that Google regards one factor in this process of 
pivotal importance, namely the consumer of search engine services. In order for the corporation to 
thrive, its business model depends heavily on a larger audience to whom advertising can be targeted. 
Hence, the more users are routed through Google’s search services, the more attractive it becomes 
for advertisers to place their advertisements on Google.
29
 Moreover, the employed algorithms for 





                                                 
28
 H.R. Varian, Google, “Google Adwords Bidding Tutorial”, Youtube video, 15 September 2009, available online at 
<youtu.be/jRx7AMb6rZ0> (accessed 18 September 2014).  
29
 More on this, infra, Chapter III. 
30
 More on that, infra, Chapter IV. 
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III.  The Qualification of Google as Multi-Sided Platform 
III.1. Introduction 
Evidently, Google Inc. exploits a profitable business with its search engine algorithms. Outside of 
the technological workings of the algorithm, it therefore attracts the question how Search operates 
from an economic perspective. As will be shown, the search engine market operates along the lines 
of a fairly novel type of market, namely that of the multi-sided platform market. 
Whereas the more “traditional” markets consist of multiple actors for supply and demand who 
meet each other on a market and thereby establish a price, in the more “novel” markets such a direct 
link is more diffuse.
31
 Vast technological progress over the last decades, apart from bringing forth 




The above can be exemplified by the fierce competition between the Microsoft Disk Operating 
System and the Apple Macintosh or Apple Operating System a 20-odd years ago.
33
 As a customer, 
the decision for either OS (irrespective of underlying computer hardware) would inevitably be based 
on the prices of both OS’s and the distinct qualities of the products; however, it would also depend 
on which of the customer’s friends and family members. For instance, compatibility issues could 
occur when transferring documents. Also, the possibility to share experiences with the system would 
be made easier when someone in the vicinity uses the same product. As a consequence, distinct 
‘networks’ for the OS emerged, consisting of users bases that only opted for that particular product. 
Independent software developers would, then, find it important to reach the largest customer base 
possible; the larger the customer group, the more profitable it would be to invest in developing 
software for that particular OS. Consequently, OS’s have formed distinct market of themselves. 
III.2. Multi-sided Platform Markets 
These novel markets have sparked considerable academic debate over the recent years, in particular 
concerning two-sided or multi-sided platform (MSP) markets.
34
 For instance, computer and software 
development is not the only industry: gaming consoles and game development, music streaming 
services, internet portals, and search engines are all markets that have apparently different economic 
characteristics compared to regular economic scrutiny. 
As a consequence, the widespread emergence of these and similar markets has brought discussion 
on the emerging multi-sided theories. As of yet, academics have not come to clear understanding on 
the definition of and the precise conditions for this concept.
35
 This article, therefore, adopts the 
following definition of a multi-sided platform, thereby also attempting to reconcile any existing 
controversies: a medium through which actors can internalise externalities, which gives rise to 
network effects and where the operator displays bilateral market power. After succinct explanation of 
the relevant components, this definition will be applied to Google Search. 
                                                 
31
 The example here would be a supermarket, buying its goods for a certain price and selling it to whoever enters the 
shop. Mutual competition among shops exert a negative pressure on the price to the consumer. 
32
 Hereinafter, individual searchers of search engine platforms, and of Google in particular, are called “consumers”. 
Even though advertisers essentially are consumers of the Google Search platform as well, they are distinguished from 
the searching audience and solely depicted as “advertisers”. 
33
 S.J. Liebowitz & S.E. Margolis, “Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
vol. 8, nr. 2, Spring 1994, 133-150, p. 133. 
34
 Introduced by D.S. Evans, “Multi-sided platform markets”, Yale Journal on regulation, vol. 20, 2003, 326-381. 
35
 A. Hagiu & J. Wright, “Multi-Sided Platforms”, Working Paper 12-024 of 12 October 2011 for Harvard Business 




The most logical and undisputed, potentially even overlooked, first aspect of an MSP, is the medium 
on or through which market (trans)actions run.
36
 Whether the medium in question is an auctioning 
mechanism, on- or offline, an OS, a piece of hardware computer equipment, a newspaper, or a credit 




III.2.2. Internalizing externalities 
Secondly, MSP markets emerge in order to internalize an externality that arises between various 
parties. This entails an enablement for one to communicate with, contract with, or contact an other, 
which would have be much more difficult, had the particular medium not existed.
38
 Credit cards, for 
example, encompass ways of direct and reliable payment to merchants without the need for cash or a 
positive bank balance, and they give a lenient method of payment for customers, as they only pay the 
bill at the end of the month. From this also follows that separate services are provided to separate 
types of customers: for instance, calling and receiving calls, paying and receiving payment, or easily 
meeting single men and meeting single women, the services are distinct. 
III.2.3. Network effects 
The third criterion, in particular, considers the existence or necessity of indirect network 
externalities. This concept demands more explanation, as it has delivered significant debate amongst 
scholars as well. Whereas externalities are the effects of production or consumption that are not 
accounted for in the cost price, network externalities concern the incremental increase of the benefit 
or disadvantage of increased production or consumption.
39
 The figure below exemplifies this by 
ways of a simplified network. 
                                                 
36
 A factor acknowledged by E.G. Weyl, “A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms”, American Economic Review, vol. 
100, September 2010, p. 1644 
37
 This condition, however, does not stand independently, because a platform for buyers and sellers to meet each other 
already exists. Nevertheless, it is for the following conditions that these specific platforms emerge; it is also why in 
this passage, reference will be made to multi-sided platform markets or MSP’s and not to the often read “two-sided 
market”, preventing the pitfall of the often-used argument against the existence of multi-sided markets that “every 
market is two-sided”, see Hagiu &Wright 2011, p. 2. 
38
 Ibidem. Without the platform, transaction costs would be very high for either party to find the other. 
39
 The most prominent example is a telephone network. When persons A and B connect via a telephone line, the derived 
benefit amounts to one available connection for both A and B. Person C, however, when connecting to this mutual 
connection, benefits more, namely with the possibility to connect to two persons, instead of to only one. Hence, the 
value of being connected to the telephone network increases incrementally with every new connection, as person D 
will benefit with three connections, E with four, et cetera. 
Diagram 3. Network Effects Exemplified 
10 
 
This theory can be complicated further, as network effects exist in two flavours: direct and 
indirect. In the simplified example above, the utility derived from being connected to the network 
increases directly with additional connections, meaning these are direct network effects. 
Nevertheless, telephone networks consist of different service providers (who might offer them on 
separate networks),
40
 of callers, and of receivers.
41
 Another example is heterosexual dating clubs, 
where the number of men present is dependent on the number of women willing to join such clubs.
42
 
Hence, those effects depend on the availability or actions of one of the two sides and are, therefore, 
called indirect network effects.
43
 
As established by Evans in one of the first articles discussing multi-sided platform markets, 
indirect network effects concern the establishing factor for MSP’s.44 In recent years, however, 
several authors have seemingly thought this demarcation to be inaccurate for defining MSP’s. 
Weyl, and Fleischer & Smith, amongst others, speak of cross network effects, and Weyl defines 
them as follows: “[u]sers’ benefits from participation depend on the extent of user participation on 
the other side of the market, which varies with market conditions”.45 This might indicate that in order 
for the market to work, both sides have to be “on board”, meaning that the value for one side of the 
network or product used will increase as soon as participation on the other side increases.
46
 It also 
implies that both sides value the participation of the other side equally.
47
 
                                                 
40
 T. Valletti, “Mobile Call Termination: A Tale of Two-Sided Markets”, Communications and Strategies, vol. 61, 
2006, p. 61-77. 
41
 Especially with regard to pricing schemes for receiving calls, the utility derived from the network by those connected 
may depend on the number of calls made and received; e.g. D. Jeon, J. Laffont & J. Tirole, “On the ‘Receiver-Pays’ 
Principle”, The RAND Journal of Economics , vol. 35, no. 1, Spring 2004, p. 85-110; more recently, Á.L. López, 
“Mobile termination rates and the receiver-pays regime”, Information Economics and Policy, vol. 23, is. 2, June 
2011, p. 171–181;  
42
 D.S. Evans, “Multi-sided platform markets”, Yale Journal on regulation, vol. 20, 2003, 326-381, p. 327 ff; in turn, 
derived from H.W. French, “Osaka Journal: Japanese Date Clubs take the Muss out of Mating”, NY Times, 13 
February 2001, at A4.  
43
 Also designated as cross-group effects, M. Armstrong, “Competition in two-sided markets”, RAND Journal of 
Economics, vol. 37, no. 3, Autumn 2006, p. 668–691. 
44
 D.S. Evans, “Multi-sided Platform markets”, Yale Journal on Regulation, vol. 20, p. 332. 
45
 E. Weyl, “Price Theory of Multi-sided Platforms”, The American Economic Review, vol. 100, no. 4, September 2010, 
p. 1644. 
46
 See also, R. Fleischer & D.A. Smith, “Two-Sided Markets in the EU: An Attempted Demystification”, Working 
Paper at University of Chicago, 2012, p.2 available online at <home.uchicago.edu/~davidsmith/ 
research/TSM2012.pdf> (accessed 18 September 2014). 
47
 See pt. iv) in Weyl 2010, p. 1645.  
Diagram 4. Exemplification Of Indirect Network Effects 
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In economic literature, in order for the platform to work efficiently, it has been established both 
sides have to be “on board”.48 However, the crux is the start of the entire business operation, namely 
which side is the best to be attracted first, or how large one side has to be in order to gain sufficient 
interest of the other side.
49
 This issue related to indirect networks effects is designated as the 
chicken-and-egg issue.
50
 This hurdle for starting businesses is linked with the doctrine of barriers to 
entry in competition law, more of which is covered in section IV.3.4.  
Hagiu and Wright, however, disagree entirely with this view. According to them, those definitions 
would either rule out, or include, entities/markets that would be contradicting the conditions, in other 
words the definitions would suffer from both under- as over-inclusiveness.
51
 The argument by the 
authors is that if, on the one hand, those effects are requisite for at least one of the sides, any shop 
having multiple kinds of products and brands for sale would be included, because customers “value 
the number and variety of suppliers’ products carried by the retailer”, rendering the condition over-
inclusive.
52
 However, shops and supermarkets generally are no MSP’s, because upstream 
wholesalers or overarching distribution centres negotiate with producers; neither shops, nor 
consumers themselves do so. Hence, the medium in this sense does not enable direct contact between 
producer and consumer, preventing the the second criterion of this definition to be fulfilled. 
On the other hand, the definition would suffer from under-inclusiveness when requiring the value 
of both sides, because, allegedly, it would fail to incorporate so-called advertisement-supported 
media markets, such as television channels, newspapers and internet search engines. The reason 
conveyed is that customers “do not care about” the number of advertisers on these platforms.53 This 
argument seems to depart from the notion, that in order for positive network effects to be established 
on media markets, customers have to enjoy seeing or reading advertisements. The question, however, 
is whether that degree of likeability of advertisements amongst customers matters. What seems more 
important is the increase of value that an increase in advertisers has for consumers. 
Customers value advertising on platforms, not only because it makes the platform affordable, but 
also because the advertising service benefits the customer. Indeed, customers enjoy the service that 
the media platform itself provides, namely the provision of content: no rational person would 
purchase a newspaper solely in order to read advertisements. Also, for instance, people enjoy 
watching television, and utilise search engines to gather information. Hence, the medium aims at the 
provision and acquiescence of content. 
Nevertheless, every newspaper displays advertisements, whether provided free-of-charge or on 
paid subscription.
54
 Advertisers aim to introduce new products and services or increase their 
awareness with a large audience in order to acquire sales. They know that displaying an ad or 
                                                 
48
 E.g. J. Rochet & J. Tirole, “Two-sided markets: a progress report”, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 37, No. 3, 
Autumn 2006, p. 645–667, p. 646 & 665, as referred to by D.S. Evans & R. Schmalensee, “The Industrial 
Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms”, Competition Policy International, vol. 3, nr. 1, Spring 2007; 
also, Filistrucchi, Geradin & Van Damme, “Identifying Two-Sided Markets”, TILEC Discussion paper, 21 February 
2012, p. 2, 6 and 7 available online at <ssrn.com/abstract=2008661>. 
49
 Or, how both can be attracted at the same time; see, e.g., S.P. King, “For the Student, Two-Sided Markets”, The 
Australian Economic Review, vol. 46, nr. 2, p. 248. 
50
 B. Caillaud & B. Jullien, “Chicken and Egg. Competition among Intermediation Service Providers,” RAND Journal 
of Economics, vol. 34, 2003, p. 521–552. See also, D. Sokoler, “How to Solve the Two-sided Platform Chicken-and-
Egg Problem: A Great Harvest!”, Online Economy blog entry, available online at <onlineeconomy.org/how-to-solve-
the-two-sided-platform-chicken-and-egg-problem-a-great-harvest>. See also, infra, par. IV.2.2.2.v. 
51
 A. Hagiu & J. Wright 2011, p. 6. 
52
 These, however, are not a form of platform market, because retailers or overarching distribution centres individually 
negotiate with producers, hence, there is no enabling of direct contact between producer and consumer. This renders 
the argument somewhat ineffective.  
53
 A. Hagiu & J. Wright 2011, p. 6. See also, G. Luchetta, “Is the Google Platform a Two-Sided Market?”, 30 April 
2012, p. 15-16, available online at <ssrn.com/abstract=2048683> (accessed 18 September 2014). 
54
 As already affirmed by, e.g., W. M. Corden, “The Maximisation of Profit by a Newspaper”, The Review of Economic 
Studies, vol. 20, no. 3, 1952-1953, 181-190, p. 181-182. 
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commercial does not immediately result in the sale of a product (also known as conversion).
55
 It both 
demands the right set of customers and a degree of convincing. By their investments in advertising, 
they increase the value of the network for new consumers, because the network can still be supplied 
for a low price at maintaining quality. Moreover, irrespective of their efficiency, advertisers succeed 
in their aim, because they meet a demand for relevant advertising.
56
 
In economic terms, because transaction costs exist between advertiser (seller) and end user 
(buyer) – a buyer usually is unaware of a seller’s existence or its prices – the medium creating this 
awareness decreases transaction costs.
57
 Also, because companies such as Google derive their 




Furthermore, those who absolutely dislike advertisements and will never respond to them, yet 
who continue to use the medium are essentially free riders of the platform. They benefit from the 
network, from the affordability, and from the display of potentially beneficial products or services, 
though do not add value by responding to the advertisements.
59
 
Lastly, in literature, the notion has been uttered that within media markets, two separate markets 
and two distinct types of customers would exist, namely the market for advertising and one for 
content.
60
 This argument, however, seems unconvincing. For instance, with a newspaper, content and 
advertisements are usually displayed on one page. Also, strategically placed ads make it highly 
unlikely not to view them. What is important, but that is a business strategy decision made by the 
company, is the ratio and degree of visibility of ads versus the content that a medium wishes to 
display.
61
 Hence, the services offered can be distinguished from one another, yet both exist on one 
market. 
III.2.4. Bilateral market power. 
The final characteristic of MSP’s is the ability for the operator of the platform to charge different 
prices to either side of the platform for using the platform, also known as an expression of the 
bilateral market power of the operator.
62
 Whereas, for example, setting equal prices for men as for 
women would result in no singles dating in the club, the operator charges more for men and, 
                                                 
55
 As a matter of fact, in Europe, an increase of 1% in advertisement spenditure has a higher advertising elasticity than 
compared to the United States, R. Sethuraman, G.J. Tellis & R. A. Briesch, “How Well Does Advertising Work? 
Generalizations from Meta-Analysis of Brand Advertising Elasticities”, Journal of Marketing Research, vol. 48, June 
2011, p. 457-471. See also H.R. Varian, “The Economics of Internet Search”, Rivista di Politica Economica, 
November-December 2006, p. 178. 
56
 One way in which this is shown is by the bids that advertisers place on certain keywords. When a keyword to the 
product is more relevant, the higher the bid will turn out. The same could, therefore, be concluded for the attraction of 
advertisers to types of platforms, for instance the large amount of advertisements for internet connection subscriptions 
and smartphones in free newspapers. See e.g. Y. Chen & C. He, “Paid Placement: Advertising and Search on the 
Internet”, NET Institute Working Paper No. 06-02, September 2006, p. 2, available online at 
<ssrn.com/abstract=936472>. See also the website <getrelevantordie.com> or J. Cohen, “How do I know where to 
advertise?”, A Smart Bear blog entry of 5 June 2012, available online at <blog.asmartbear.com/begin-
advertising.html> (accessed 18 September 2014). 
57
 More importantly, the customer might not even have an idea of the existence of the product or service in the first 
place. Advertisements can not only create awareness, but also demand. 
58
 See e.g. the 2013 Financial Tables on the Investor relations page of Google, totalling advertising revenue for 2013 at 
$50.578.000,-, tables are available online at <http://investor.google.com/financial/2013/tables.html> (accessed 18 
September 2014). 
59
 Considering this an inherent consequence of advertisement-financed platforms, the matter of good advertising policy 
seems to become one of relevance, instead of appearance: the relevant announcements have to be shown to the 
relevant crowd in order to draw attention. 
60
 E.g. G. Luchetta 2012, p. 3 ff. 
61
 Long commercial blocks within a movie or TV show are generally perceived as irritable; the same can be said about 
the number of ads in free newspapers, making them similar to mere advertisement brochures. 
62
 Weyl 2010, p. 1644. 
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relatively little to nothing for women upon joining. This not only makes the platform operational, but 
also potentially profitable.
 63
 This notion of price-setting is central to the getting “both sides on 
board” aspect of an MSP.64 The following explains that this works in a peculiar fashion for Google. 
 
One could argue that, once a platform functions properly, competition between these platforms 
becomes difficult, because of the indirect network effects and benefits derived. On the one hand, 
users are can be locked-in, experiencing switching costs. Nevertheless, on various aspects, 
competition for end users exists. For instance, in advertisement-supported markets, advertisers 
usually advertise on multiple platforms. Also, customers generally read more than one newspaper, 
either on- or offline, paid or for free. In the market for payment, people and merchants have or accept 
multiple ways of payment, such as credit or debit cards, or cash money. This phenomenon is often 
referred to as multi-homing by end-users.
65
 The degree in which multi-homing occurs is essential for 
establishing abuse of dominance situations, as dominance is less likely to be established, whenever 
more consumers are likely to use similar platforms at the same time.
66
 
III.3. Application to Google Search 
III.3.1. Introduction  
Having explained the relevant general characteristics of MSP’s, in the following section, Google 
Search will be tested according to this definition. Even though the literature is sincerely expanding 
on MSP theory,
67
 by and large, Google Inc. remains uncovered.
68
 Therefore, the following assesses 
the medium, explains the three-sidedness of the engine, as well as the various network effects 
separate sides exhibit. Lastly, the particular bilateral market power of the firm is covered. 
III.3.2. The medium 
The medium consists of the Google Search engine, accessible through http://google.com/, and of the 
AdWords and AdSense services, accessible via http://google.com/adwords and 
                                                 
63
 This is probably also why several authors refer to the price-setting as a form of cross-subsidization.J. Rochet and J. 
Tirole, “Platform Competition in Two-sided Markets”, Journal of the European Economic Association, June 2003, 
vol 1, ed. 4. p. 1017-1018. See also T. Eisenmann, G. Parker & M.W. Van Alstyne, “Strategies for Two-Sided 
Markets”, Harvard Business Review, vol. 84, October 2006, p. 94. 
64
 D.S. Evans, “The Antitrust Economics Of Two-Sided Markets” , p. 2 and 50 ff., available online at 
<ssrn.com/abstract= 332022> (accessed 18 September 2014). As the demand for one side, for instance video game 
developer, depends on the platform’s (the video game console) other side, viz. the number of costumers, the platform 
operator could decide to demand a price from the game developer in order to have its software exploited on the 
medium. However, the willingness to pay for a consumer appears to be higher, when a console has numerous games. 
Hence, the console’s operator would do best at establishing a lower price for software developers, therewith 
increasing the number of applications for the console, and charging a relatively higher price for customers. 
65
 D.S. Evans, “The Antitrust Economics of Two-Sided Markets”, p. available online at <ssrn.com/abstract= 332022> 
(accessed 18 September 2014). This concept originally was used to describe a device being able to connect to more 
than one computer network, providing for a more reliable IP network. The opposite is called singlehoming. 
66
 See par. IV.3.4.3. 
67
 E.g. the appendix in D.S. Evans & R. Schmalensee, “The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses”, p. 
47, in: R. Blair & D. Sokol, eds., Oxford Handbook on International Antitrust Economics, Oxford University Press, 
2014 (forthcoming). 
68
 In various articles, it is simply mentioned as an example of two-sidedness. Cf. A. Hagiu, “Multi-Sided Platforms: 
From Microfoundations to Design and Expansion Strategies”, Working Paper 09-115, 23 February 2008, p. 5 & 6, 
available online at <ssrn.com/abstract=1372754> (accessed 18 September 2014). Conversely, G. Luchetta 2013; C. 
Argentón & J. Prüfer, “Search Engine Competition with Network Externalities”, Journal of Competition Law & 





 As such, three services are provided to three different types 
of users, making it a genuine multi-sided platform.
70
  
III.3.3. Internalizing Externalities 
As its primary activity, Google crawls websites on the WWW and indexes them for free. For those 
that do not wish their web pages to be crawled, an opt-out is possible.
71
 As a consequence, the 
website will not be incorporated in the crawling activities, and will not emerge on any search results: 
then, Google Search users will not be able to find the website. 
The second side consists of end users, and the service is distinct from the typical media platform. 
Whereas radio and TV channels, and newspapers directly provide content to end users and 
advertisers, a search engine only provides the portal or the gateway to accessing the (online) content. 
The information that, moreover, is supplied with every displayed hyperlink is the cached material on 
Google’s servers, and is neither complete nor current information. 
Lastly, the third side of Google Search consists of the money makers, the advertisers. This ties 
with both the customer end and the index end of the search service. As mentioned previously, 
advertisement services are offered by Google Inc. not only next to the search results, but also on 
indexed web pages themselves. Furthermore, advertisers are not only large firms: any interested 
party can advertise for any keyword or combination of keywords to have a message supported by or 
advertised on Google. 
                                                 
69
 The search engine, moreover, extends further than merely the web page, as it has been integrated into multiple pieces 
of web browsing software as search box or integrated even into the address bar (Google Chrome). For simplicity’s 
sake, and the sake of providing a clear diagram of the platform, these other forms the engine takes will not be taken 
into account in this research. 
70
 Conversely, see K.L. Devine, “Preserving Competition in Multi-Sided Innovative Markets: How Do You Solve a 
Problem Like Google?”, North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology, vol. 1, ed. 1, Fall 2008, p. 80; also G. 
Luchetta, “Is the Google Platform a Two-Sided Market?”, 30 April 2012, available online at 
<ssrn.com/abstract=2048683> (accessed 18 September 2014), and M.R. Patterson, “Google and Search Engine 
Market Power”, Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, Occasional Paper Series, July 2013, p. 16-18. 
71
 A website can indicate the preference not to be indexed by placing a text-file in the designated directory of the 
website, carrying the header “robots.txt”. See for an explanation on how this works Robotstxt.org, “About 
/robots.txt”, available online at <robotstxt.org/robotstxt.html> (accessed 18 September 2014). E.g., 
http://example.com/robots.txt contains a specific code, entailing a response to a web crawler that all content on the 
domain is not up for crawling or indexing. See also Google Support, “Block search indexing with meta tags”, 
available online at <support.google.com/webmasters/answer/93710?hl=en>. For instance, the website for EU 
legislation <eur-lex.europa.eu> has opted out for the so-called Googlebot, e.g. on <eur-
lex.europa.eu/robots.txt?uri=CELEX:12008E102:EN:NOT> (accessed 18 September 2014). 
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As the reader can hereby infer, these interlinked services make Google Search a three-sided 
platform, graphically illustrated in Diagram 5.
72
 Via the search box, customers enter queries and are 
able to view and come in touch with advertisers and websites. Via AdWords, a company can reach 
out to consumers, and, via AdSense, websites can reach advertisers.
73
 
III.3.4. Network effects 
In contrast to current economic theory on MSP’s, the search engine is structured in such a manner 
that it displays both direct and indirect network effects. Irrespective of its (PageRank) algorithm, this 
might also explain the large popularity of Google. Because the platform consists of three sides, for 
each side the network effects should be assessed. Recalling the definition of direct network effects, it 
should mean that the value of the good or service should increase successively for new entrants. For 
both indexed websites and customers this holds true. The advertisers side experiences only indirect 
or same-side network effects. 
                                                 
72
 See also R. Pollock, “Is Google the Next Microsoft: Competition, Welfare and Regulation in Online Search”, Review 
of Network Economics, vol. 9, ed. 4, 2010, article 4, p.7., and A. Lohse, “Comments on Google’s Proposed 
Commitments to the European Commission”, letter dated 27 May 2013, p.1, available online at <ruhr-uni-
bochum.de/ls-hueffer/dls/Downloads/Google%20Statement.PDF> (accessed 18 September 2014).  
73
 For websites, Google enables contact or visits, as it internalises the externality of the ability to be found on the 
internet, hence decreasing transaction costs. It works similarly for the advertising services, as ads are made visible to 
consumers searching for websites, which either focus on or are related to the initial query, in turn enabling contact 
and potentially contract. Vice versa, contact and contract with consumers is enabled by Google for both advertisers 
and indexed web pages. 
Diagram 5. The Google Search Platform 
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First, the side of indexed websites benefits increasingly when more websites become crawled. The 
more websites are crawled, the more become indexed and the more can be reached by searchers. If 
more websites are indexed, one particular website will have to compete with a multitude of other 
websites in order to draw traffic. At first glance, it might seem that indexation of web material is 
counterproductive to the websites themselves. 
However, irrespective of the behaviour of customers and advertisers, the value of the search 
engine with regard to the indexed websites will increase with every added web page, due to 
PageRank. On the basis of the algorithm, every website in the index is assessed on the number of 
links that link to it. As a consequence, when new websites are crawled and indexed, a renewal of the 
page rank assessment will take place; when the engine is used, the most relevant results will 
emerge.
74
 Hence, every new piece of information, contained on new websites could lead to a 
reassessment of the search ranking results, improving the Google Search network and making it 
more valuable for websites to also join the network. Therefore, it can be concluded here that also 
websites experience direct network effects. 
Similarly to the argument made with regard to the websites, new entering customers gain more by 
searching on Google. Using Google means inserting web searches into the Google Search box. As 
mentioned before, every time a query is entered, it is also stored and connected to the searcher’s IP, 
cookies and other personalizing or localizing data. The algorithms of Google incorporate this data as 
factors for new searches. As such, Search “learns”, supports and potentially improves the searching 
behaviour of persons, regions and even nations. Thus, every query directly leads to more valuable 




Subsequently, for users of Search indirect network effects exist, which are related to the 
involvement of websites on the one hand, and of advertisers on the other. Regarding the former, if 
more websites are incorporated in a search, more results can be displayed. From a quantitative 
perspective, this will lead to a higher value for customers, because the opportunity to find a match to 
a query is boosted. Moreover, from a qualitative point of view, when more content is incorporated, 
the searching experience will become more diverse, meaning it would also make it more attractive to 
utilise Search for searchers otherwise uninterested. As a final remark, considering PageRank, if more 
websites are indexed, a more thorough analysis of websites is executed with respect to the query. 
III.3.5. The unusual shape of Google’s bilateral market power. 
Lastly, the bilateral market power of Google allows it to set differing prices for the several sides of 
the market. However, the fulfilment of this criterion takes on a uniquely different form compared to 
the described MSP’s in literature. Both the services to end users and to websites are provided for 
free, whilst prices are charged to advertisers. Whereas, furthermore, most advertising schemes charge 
on the basis of the number of displays, in which the highest bidder takes the first spot and fills the 
slot, an advertiser on a search engine, as aptly described by Edelman e.a., “pays the search engine for 
sending the user to its web page”, also known as pay-per-click or cost-per-click (PPC or CPC).76  
Furthermore, Google arranges, rather than fixes, prices by ways of auctions. As extra icing on the 
cake, these ad auctions sit uniquely within general auctioning theory. In order to grasp the manner in 
which the firm sets the price to individual advertisers, which is according to a so-called generalised 
second-price auctioning mechanism, a comparison with several well-known auctions is displayed 
                                                 
74
 Whether it de facto displays the actually most relevant pages remains to be seen. Relevance, in this sense, is  merely 
defined as “the page to which is linked the most”, and actual relevance to the query entered might be doubtful. 
75
 Cf. C. Argenton, & J. Prüfer, “Search Engine Competition with Network Externalities”, Journal of Competition Law 
& Economics, vol. 8, ed. 1, 2012, 73-105, where they interpret the effects as a “peculiar (intertemporal) type of 
indirect network externalities”, p. 76, and relate those to the learning curve hypothesis in economics, p. 80. 
76
 B. Edelman, M. Ostrovsky & M. Schwarz, “Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling 
Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords”, NBER Working Paper no. 11765, November 2005, p. 2. 
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first. Relevant in this sense is the manner in which the dominant strategy of bidders is addressed by 
different auctions. 
III.3.5.1. Other auctions and dominant bidding strategy 
For a profit-maximizing undertaking employing an auction, the optimal dominant strategy of bidders 
has to be taken into account. With regard to the dominant strategy of bidders in well-known auctions, 
the value adhered to auctioned goods does not fully reflect the actual willingness to pay. In those 
auctions, the incentive for bidders has always been to bid lower than the actual value, in order to pay 
a lower price for the acquired good. Such auctions, in which bidders are confronted with either a 
descending (Dutch flower auctions) or an ascending (English art auctions) bid structure, therefore 
have a slightly downwards sloping effect as to the price.
77
 This causes an incentive to cheat on the 
competition; in other words, the dominant strategy for every competitor within these auctions is to 
attach a lower than the true value to the bid.
78
 This not only is the charm, but also the detriment of 
several auctioning mechanisms. 
Further, the so-called Vickrey auction theoretically reflects the true value in a bid, allowing the 
highest bidder to take the lot, yet to pay the price of the second highest bid.
79
 Cheating in the form of 
inserting a low bid would not be effective, because those bids would easily be outbid by competitors. 
The incentive for all players would then be to bid truthfully according to the value attached.
80
  
A further developed auction called Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction organises bids where 
the ultimate price to pay was based on the externalities or loss of welfare caused by the winning 
bidder unto the other parties.
81
 In other words, as stipulated by Edelman e.a., “each player’s payment 
is equal to the negative externality that he imposes on others, assuming that bids are equal to 
values”.82 The relevance for Google in this sense, is that it utilizes a bid structure that incorporates 
both the Vickrey and VCG mechanisms. Google has a large audience of potential buyers to attract 
advertisers towards the auction; consequently, under those circumstances, advertisers will bid high. 
However, the entire search engine performs as the platform by ways of which the slots are sold. The 
following section on the Ad Auction bid structure explains this further. 
III.3.5.2. The bid structure of Google Ad auctions 
As established, Google is a media platform. As regards pricing, a media platform does not set a fixed 
price on the advertising service, whereas other MSP’s do. The access to and use of Google is free for 
consumers and for websites. Only advertisers are charged, the price of which serves as leverage for 
or cross-subsidization of the other sides. 
Nevertheless, this pricing and ranking of advertisers differs from the schemes used by other media 
platforms. The circulation of a newspaper or magazine gives an indication of the number of displays, 
                                                 
77
 Hence, those auctions are called Dutch respectively English auctions. The first often works by a clock that moves 
down from a high value; by pressing the button first, one can stop the clock at the desired price. The latter works by 
establishing an essentially low base price, and raising the price as bids are confirmed consecutively. 
78
 D. Easley & J. Kleinberg, Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning about a Highly Connected World, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 2010, p. 254 ff. 
79
 W. Vickrey, “Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders”, The Journal of Finance, vol. 16, ed. 
1, March 1961, p. 8-37, available online at <jstor.org/stable/2977633> (accessed 18 September 2014). Supposedly he 
invented this type of auction. However, see D. Lucking-Reiley, “Vickrey Auctions in Practice: From Nineteenth-
Century Philately to Twenty-First-Century E-Commerce,” Journal of Economic Perspectives vol. 14, ed. 3, Summer 
2000, p. 183-192, describing the practice as dating back to the 1890s. 
80
 Idem, p. 20.  
81
 E.g., in I. Ashlagi, B. Edelman & H.S. Lee, “Competing Ad Auctions”, Harvard Business School Working Paper, no. 
10-055, 27 September 2013.  
82
 B. Edelman, M. Ostrovsky & M. Schwarz 2005, p. 8. However, the Vickrey and VCG mechanisms did not appear 
entirely feasible in real life. The mechanism, amongst other things, elicited collusion amongst bidding parties, 
collectively keeping bids and thus prices low, P. Klemperer, Auctions Theory and Practice, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004, p. 33, nt. 91 and 64, nt. 7. 
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forming the value of and price for placing an ad.
83
 Also, TV shows or programs that are notable for 
drawing large publicity are known to drive up the price for commercials.
84
 Similarly, the price for 
search advertising depends on the number of viewers. However, because the price is only established 
by the interested (i.e., clicking) customer, prices are executed per individual click, thereby 
distinguishing them sufficiently from any other media platform.
85
 In essence, search advertisements 
are not sold independently from the actions of individual users. 
Google does not set any prices; it merely regulates the price-setting by ways of auctions. Billions 
of ad auctions are automatically run per day on the servers, which are executed after queries are 
entered.
86
 Advertisers enter the keywords on which they wish to bid and connect these to their 
advertisement hyperlinks. The competition in the Google ad auction is based on CPC and on the so-
called Quality Score, which is assessed on the relation between the keyword and the advertisement, 
such as the wording of the ad, the layout of the website, the click through rate (CTR) of customers to 
the website and multiple other, potentially secret, factors. Therefore, every advertiser is incentivised 
to provide for the most – in the widest sense – attractive web page in order to gain a higher or the 
highest position in the Sponsored Search Results list. As a consequence, the ‘price on search’ is 
never homogeneous.
87
 This reveals one of two peculiarities of the auctions that Google runs, namely 
that the bid itself does not solely determine the highest rank. Another is that the price paid for a click 
is not based solely on the bid. 
As stated, Google ad auctions seem to incorporate both the Vickrey and VCG mechanisms. They 
run on what in literature has been called the generalised second-price auction.
88
 It is somewhat 
similar to the Vickrey auction, as originally, it let an advertiser pay the price of the advertiser on the 
slot below it. However, the distribution of slots is not solely based on the entered bid price. As 
mentioned above, the bid is multiplied by a so-called Quality Score.
89
 Subsequently, various updates 
in the Google algorithms have altered and attempted at ameliorating the assessment of the ad quality 
and as such the positioning of advertisers in the auctions. This algorithmic assessment results in a 
factor by which the initial bid is multiplied, resulting in the ranking of the advertisements. An 
advertiser pays the minimum amount in order to retain its position.
90
 In order to determine the price 
of a click at the quality score of the advertiser, it has to beat [bid] times [Quality Score] of the first 
competitor ranked below it.
91
 Furthermore, it should be noted that it is an auction for clicks, and, 
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 It is an indication, because the number of subscription does not necessarily mean the number of readers. For instance, 
as written on the back of the Dutch free newspaper Spits, on average, a Spits is read by four different people a day, 
considering their distributed locations (stations, public buildings, etc.). 
84
 E.g. D. Thompson, “Super Bowl Ads Are Still Super Cheap: $4 Million for 30 Seconds Is a Bargain”, 1 February 
2013, The Atlantic, available online at <theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/02/super-bowl-ads-are-still-super-
cheap-4-million-for-30-seconds-is-a-bargain/272628> (accessed 18 September 2014). See also S. Levy, In the Plex. 
How Google thinks, works, and shapes our lives, New York, Simon and Schuster, 2011, p. 330.  
85
 Nevertheless, the price on these auctions can reach quite phenomenal heights, as well, see NowSourcing, “Who Buys 
All Those Google Ads?”, Visual.ly information graphic, available online at <visual.ly/who-buys-all-those-google-
ads> (accessed 18 September 2014). 
86
 H.R. Varian, “How auctions set prices”, Google Official Blog entry, 12 May 2008, available online at 
<googleblog.blogspot.nl/2008/05/how-auctions-set-ad-prices.html> (accessed 18 September 2014). 
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therefore, many executed auctions/rankings merely result in displays, not in clicked advertisements, 
and not in sales to Google. 
An example can clarify the theory explained. Imagine three advertising slots available for a 
particular query, and four bidding advertisers. The bids and the Quality score (in the second and third 
column) are fictitious, and the Ad Rank, rank and CPC are derived by ways of the formulas.
92
 
Diagram 6. Table of an Ad Auction for 3 Available Slots 
When a query is entered, Google runs these auctions, by assessing the relevant keywords in the 
query, determining the number of slots available, the number of advertisers who have associated 
their bids with the entered keyword(s), the quality scores, and assembles the ranking. All this literally 
happens in the blink of an eye. From the table it follows that all bidders pay below their initial bid, 
yet the actual cost of the highest ranked bidder is lower than that of the second highest bidder (2 vs. 
2,67), due to its higher Quality Score. Consequently, not only could competition for the highest bids 
follow, but also for the improvement of the advertiser’s website and advert, as it could decrease the 
price that it has to pay.
93
 
Allegedly, however, this auctioning mechanism relapses in the initial problem as signified by 
Vickrey, which is not stating the price at the actual value of the item.
94
 Individual advertisers rather 
set their bids on the basis of revenue/profit they can make with the advertising mechanism. Profits 
are only gained in the number of sold products or services. Those who choose to operate on 
AdWords base their true value not only on the value of the bid alone, but also invest time and effort 
(and thus, money) in the quality of the advertisement, so-called opportunity costs. 
The above is an explanation of Google’s price-setting market power, which is no power in and of 
itself, but more a role that offers the mechanisms that allow individual users to set the price on 
Search. Ultimately, this full description and elaboration on the utilization and profitability of the 
auctions by and for Google serves as a sound example of why multi-sided platforms can be 
profitable, without keeping fixed the sum of charged prices for both sides.
95
 With the market forces 
at play on all sides of the platform, Google has turned out to be an exceedingly profitable player on 
the world market. The sum of the cost of a click and the price of searching or indexing is never fixed, 
yet has enabled price competition for the highest ad slots.
96
 
In summary, Google utilises an auction as the price-setting mechanism for the platform of Google 
Search. With it, the firm enables parties to establish the right price for the growing number of 
advertisers vis-à-vis a growing number of end users, due to market forces and network effects. The 
auction is, therefore, dependent on three factors, which coincide with the three sides on which 
Google is active. The mechanism needs customers to click, advertisers to advertise and (good) 
websites or (good) organic search results to attract customers again, to provide for advertising space, 
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as well as to influence the ad ranking. What can be concluded from this is that Google enables high 
price-setting for particular queries by attracting more potentially interested consumers, as well as 
using their aggregated personalizing data to drive up prices conform market effects, giving the 
customer a crucial role in Google’s Search platform. Google, thus, does not set prices as any other 
MSP operator does, but it influences the bidding relationship between number of advertisers and the 
number of clients it serves, confirming its bi- or even trilateral market power. 
III.4. Conclusion 
Within the scope of relatively standard MSP definitions, Google as search engine assumes a 
currently unique role as three-sided platform, utilizing its auction-based second-pricing mechanism 
on a medium that is rife with network effects. Even though in this article only Google Search is 
scrutinised, and Google has, in the course of the last decade, introduced a large number of novel 
products and services, this model can either be applied independently to Search, but also to the 
ancillary products that Google offers. Arguably,
97
 this leads to new network effects, constantly 
attracting new customers to the Search platform, satisfying advertisers. Moreover, it could be that the 
integration of novel software, products, algorithms etc. to Google’s platform leads to stronger 
network effects and, therefore, has an even further multiplied attraction on platform users. In part, 
the following chapter will focus on these potential dominance-establishing factors, by discussing the 
legal framework on dominance within European competition law. 
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IV.  The Qualification of Google as Dominant Undertaking in 
Online Search. 
IV.1. Introduction 
As corporations grow, competition agencies become triggered to supervise the underlying markets. 
Additionally, due to current and on-going technological and economic progress, novel markets have 
arisen which experience strong innovations, as well as vigorous competition. As an exception, over 
the past 15 years, Google has provided search engine services on a worldwide scale and has 
maintained a constant financial growth, where many others have failed to do so. As a consequence, 
the curiosity of European and other competition law agencies has been sparked. 
In order for competition law to be applicable, however, various steps have to be taken. As a 
research into all these aspects is too broad for an article of this proportions, in this research, only two 
of these steps shall be examined. The relevant, overarching question for applying European 
competition law is whether or not a company such as Google can be categorised as dominant. 
Essential in this sense, which also connects to the former chapter, is the role attributed to the network 
effects that the Google Search algorithms display. As economic concepts form part of competition 
law analyses, network effects with regard to generating dominant positions deserve attention. Other 
relevant aspects in the legal assessment, such as the consideration that Google does not directly 
charge searchers for its services, and therefore might not be seen as an undertaking, shall not be 
covered in this section. It shall be taken as given that Google performs its role as undertaking under 
the EU competition rules. 
A subsidiary aim of this chapter, however, is to clarify that classic methodology in the application 
and enforcement of rules on dominance has become old-fashioned. Whereas competition agencies 
might be triggered to enforce the competition law, they appear to be insufficiently capable of doing 
so with respect to the novel markets. The failure of classic market analysis methodology is therefore 
also addressed in this chapter, forming part of the larger dominance assessment of Google’s Search 
platform. The shift that the European Commission has therefore taken towards Commitments 
Decisions is also covered. 
The approach of the chapter is as follows: by ways of assessing the treaty provisions and the 
relevant case law, a market assessment is introduced in section 3.2 (subsections 1-5). This forms the 
answer to the legal question underlying the assessment of Google’s potential dominant position. In 
section 3.2.6, the dominance analysis is pursued, in which definitions of dominance by several 
academics are explained, as well as various barriers to entry are brought to the fore, the most 
prominent of which are network effects. These aspects are interpreted in the light of discovered case 
law. Lastly, in section 3.3., an elaboration on the Google Commitments procedure is given. 
IV.2. The law of dominance in the EU 
Generally, when confronted with a legal issue, a lawyer or legal scholar will commence his or her 
research by analysing the basic framework that the particular applicable law has. Legal bases, 
extrapolated rules and authoritative interpretations layering on each other usually form such a 
framework. Subsequently, the issue at hand is approached, according to the derived legal structure. 
It might be that the legal approach for an antitrust issue has been structured by ways of identifying 
the market, subsequently of determining the relevant competitors and of assessing their positions and 
specific conditions in the market that may or may not make one competitor dominant, and then, of 
judging the conduct of the dominant undertaking in particular. Still, the contents of each concept 
appear to differ from market to market, from competitor to competitor and from conduct to conduct. 
Therefore, one abstracted question is, for instance, whether a uniform definition can be found with 
which practice can work. 
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Considering that common sense suggests multi-sided platforms are not incorporated in any 
competition case what so ever, though network effects are, a more specific question then becomes 
whether article 102 TFEU gives a prominent enough role for network effects by ways of which to 
assess the Google Search algorithm. 
The definitions for dominance and abuse have been given in various cases, yet, do not constitute a 
sound, workable body of law without further interpretation. Below, apart from a display of the law 
on dominance, it will also be shown that the employment of Google’s search algorithm will pose a 
problem for the application and interpretation of the law as it stands. 
IV.2.1. Treaty provision 
As the facts have been explained thoroughly enough in the previous sections, the legal qualification 
comes down to a form of unilateral action performed by one undertaking, Google Inc., and further, 
by the employment of its Search algorithm. Unilateral conduct on markets has the potential of 
triggering the application of European Union competition policy, most notably Art. 102 TFEU. To 
be precise, for fully assessing a competition case, the aspects of abuse, undertaking, dominance, the 
relevance for the internal market and the affect for the trade between Member states have to be 
addressed. In the remainder of this section, however, only the concept of dominance is covered, 
focusing mostly on network effects. 
IV.2.2. Case law. 
Dominance is a concept which has neither been defined nor otherwise legally authoritatively 
interpreted by the European legislative and enforcement branch.
98
 Over the course of the European 
Union history, this task has, therefore, been fulfilled by the European Court of Justice (hereinafter: 
“the Court”) in various cases, which concept has been found equally applicable to the concepts 
enshrined in the Treaties on European Union and on the Functioning of the European Union.
99
 
The foundation of the dominance analysis was laid down by the Court in the United Brands case, 
stating the following: 
“The dominant position referred to in this Article relates to a position of economic 
strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition 
being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its 
consumers [emphasis added]”.100 
Subsequently, the ruling was reiterated by the Court in Hoffmann-La Roche with the following, 
added, paragraph and has since then been established as standing law: 
“Such a position does not preclude some competition, which it does where there is a 
monopoly or quasi-monopoly, but enables the undertaking which profits by it, if not to 
determine, at least to have an appreciable influence on the conditions under which that 
competition will develop, and in any case to act largely in disregard of it so long as such 
conduct does not operate to its detriment.”101 
Lastly, with regard to the legal framework, once an undertaking becomes or is dominant, the 
Court bestows a special responsibility upon it, which was introduced in the Michelin case. The 
relevant part reads as follows: 
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“A finding that an undertaking has a dominant position is not in itself a recrimination 
but simply means that, irrespective of the reasons for which it has such a dominant 
position, the undertaking concerned has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct 
to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market.” 102 
This means that, even though having a dominant position itself is not prohibited, as soon as the 
respective entity is aware of its dominant status on the market, it cannot continue and behave as it 
would under (normal) competitive market conditions. These practices could lead to exploit 
consumers being exploited, competitors being excluded or its dealing partners to be discriminated 
against, which might damage competition, competitors and ultimately, consumers.
103
 
Before conducting any further research into the existence of a dominant position, it is, according 
to the definition given in UBC, necessary to establish the relevant market on which Google is likely 
to be active. A market definition itself might already give an indication of a dominant position, as it 
depends on the narrowness of the definition whether only one active entity can be defined or 
multiple. 
IV.2.3. Defining the relevant market 
Logically, before an undertaking can be seen as dominant, the relevant market has to be defined. If 
no market exists, then the rules governing dominant positions are impossible to apply. A proper 
guidance tool in the definition of the relevant market is the Commission Notice that was set up to this 
exact purpose.
104
 It divides the definition in a criterion concerning the relevant product market, and 
in one concerning the relevant geographic market.
105
  
IV.2.3.1. The relevant products market 
The relevant product market defines which goods or services exert competitive pressures between 
certain entities. It builds the foundation for assessing whether one of these entities is a dominant 
undertaking.
106
 The matter boils down to a question of the relevant characteristics and intended use 




For a preliminary concept of a market, a good starting point for assessing the structure is formed 
by elaborating on the characteristics. It provides insights on the technical comparability of the 
products on a market. To that end, the following first assesses the characteristics of the online search 
services, after which it elaborates on further existing comparability analyses as applied by the 
European Commission. 
IV.2.3.1.i. Characteristics of Search 
The classic way of analysing the relevant market focuses on the characteristics and intended use of 
the product alone.
108
 However, predominantly judging merely on those aspects could lead to a too 
broad definition of the market, as products that share general characteristics can be part of different 
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markets, yet fall under the same categorization.
109
 Also, the Commission regarded this method to be 
inadequate in demonstrating actual demand substitutability.
110
  
From the end user or searcher perspective, the service of the firms in question is the provision of 
an online search engine. Essentially and more specifically, the characteristics are the categorization 
and display of online search results, as well as the artificial intelligence with which the engine 
responds to entered queries. It is logical that end users want to find relevant web content through 
search engines, and receiving utmost precise and relevant results. Hence, logically reasoned, 
competition for customers entails competition for the most sophisticated search engine algorithm. 
The mentioned relevant search services can be horizontal as well as vertical. However, the latter 
services are also offered by innumerable, smaller suppliers: from news sites, forums, to general web 
portals, each web site moderator can employ a searching method on specific intranet web pages for 
instance. Whereas, general, horizontal and vertical web crawlers are only capable of accessing a 
website’s homepage, yet do not have the access rights (as digitally granted by a system or network 
moderator) to further investigate the website in question, these typical vertical search services are 
only offered with respect to one domain or a restricted number of domains.
111
 From a demand-side 
characteristics perspective, therefore, the definition of the market in this sense would become too 
broad if it only incorporated vertical search. See diagram 14 for a graphical distinction between 
horizontal and vertical search services. 




 Commission Notice on the Definition of the relevant Market for the Purposes of Community Competition Law, 1997, 
OJ C372/3, p. 10, pt. 36. 
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However, and this relates to the other criterion for assessing the relevant services market, the 
demand by end users is strongly linked to the other sides of the multi-sided platform, viz. websites 
and advertisements.
112
 These network effects affect the market definition, as without one of the sides, 
the entire service will and cannot be provided as is. Stated more explicitly, with regard to the 
interchangeability of the search service, the demand by searchers is dependent on the number of 
indexed websites and the number of advertisers.
113
 For instance, a search engine with an index of 
only one website would not attract queries, hence, would not attract advertisers. Similarly, an engine 
with one interested advertiser would neither make it financially worthwhile to supply search services 
to the masses without concordant payment, nor make it attractive to easily search for or find lucrative 
deals. The former indicates that the end user or searcher perspective alone is insufficient for a 
complete and correct market analysis. As such, a market analysis that incorporates network effects is 
to be applauded. 
Moreover, considering Google has employed an auction-based pricing strategy, the price-setting 
is accomplished by participants on the advertising side themselves, and it is therefore up to the 
bidding results of the auctions which price is decisive for a particular query. It might be the case that 
Google, by supplying this service to advertisers, has distinguished itself in this sense from potential 
competitors, yet it adds to the intertwinement of the platform market, making it more difficult to 
legally regard the services as separate.
114
 
Both in the crawling and indexing of websites, the organization and display of search results, and 
the manner of advertising, this horizontal-vertical distinction exists. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, horizontal crawlers search for general links, which are in turn utilised by a general, 
horizontal search query in order to deliver general search results, receiving generalised advertising. 
Therefore, on the basis of the three-sided characteristics of online search, we can define the market 
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from a consumer perspective as being the provision of an indexing, search and advertising service, 
both in both horizontal as vertical dimension. 
IV.2.3.1.ii. Demand-side substitutability  
The second aspect in order to mark the boundaries of the market is a form of substitutability analysis. 
To this end, not only characteristics are used, but also economic tests that establish the matter of 
demand side substitutability or elasticity. The main formula that tests this is the SSNIP-test, 
involving a small but significant nontransitory increase in price, also known as the hypothetical 
monopolist test.
115
 When the price of product X is raised by 5 or 10%, it can be measured to what 
extent consumers will revert to product Y. As will be shown, such an analysis is difficult for the 
market in which Google is active, because a predefined or fixed price for the mentioned service in 
the market does not exist. Until now, no online search service has ever been provided against 
payment: all providers have found financing through other means. This would make a SSNIP-like 
test difficult to apply. Nevertheless, in the following, the possibility of applying the SSNIP in a 
different form will be argued, either by pricing search or by changing the pricing strategies. 
IV.2.3.1.iii. Pricing search 
Introducing a direct price for search will likely expose a high demand elasticity of the platform. For 
instance, if searchers would have to pay even a really small, fixed price per search, the logical effect 
would be that a huge amount of searchers would move away from the engines in question and choose 
either different ones (those not incorporated in the market definition on the basis of characteristics) 
or choose other methods of finding online information. Indeed, indicating a high degree of 
substitutability between services would be a correct formulation of the market. Nevertheless, 
considering the direct price on search for all parties having been zero from its inception onwards, it 
entails a market in which the price is not an element of competition. Therefore, pricing search by 
ways of cross-elasticity would not be a suitable way of assessing the market. 
Because of the free supply of online search, no new supplier of these online services has 
considered changing to a paid service.
116
 The effect such a change would have on consumers can and 
likely will have a detrimental effect on the traffic the engine will experience. Also, as indicated 
before, the number of customers, on one side, affects the demand of customers on the other side of 
the network. However, not only would a price on search deter a large number of customers from 
using online search, the rebounding effect of a declining interest of advertisers in the search engine 
would have a downward spiral effect on the demand for users of the search engine altogether; such 
would, then, render an analysis along these change of price methods completely insufficient, as the 
intrinsic connection between one customer side and the other is not taken into account with the 
SSNIP test. 
Furthermore, the effect of price increases on (online) advertisers is not clear. This issue has been 
acknowledged, before, by the Commission with regard to Google in the online advertising 
business.
117
 In the Google/Double Click merger Decision, the EC unequivocally stated it remained 
unclear to what extent online advertisers are affected by a price change, and continued with an 
investigation of the characteristics and more reasoned substitutability of the various online ads, 
utilizing respondent surveys.
118
 The current investigation of the Google practices might indicate 
similar difficulties, as the commitments made by Google have been published on the Commission’s 
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If the indirect pricing method of the platform itself is considered, this would have a similar 
detrimental effect. An indirect increase in the price of search would entail either charging a higher 
price for advertising or increasing the available slots per search, making more advertisers pay. The 
idea behind Google’s auction-based second pricing mechanism is to stimulate competition amongst 
advertisers. Scarcity in the number of available slots not only fuels higher prices that advertisers are 
willing to pay, but also ascertains a higher chance of success for luring in customers. More choice for 
consumers, in this sense, means fewer clicks on the individual links, hence generating less revenue, 
and so, not necessarily raising the price of search. Also, the question remains whether an increased 
number of (neatly displayed) advertisements next to the search results effectively deters 
customers.
120
 Hence, with the similar feedback mechanism as mentioned in the previous paragraph, 
this would advance a declined inclination of advertising online and would not assess the genuine 
demand substitutability for search engines. 
All in all, the SSNIP or critical loss analysis is not an apt mechanism to define substitutability of 
this service in this market. As rightfully mentioned by Jones and Sufrin, “if critical loss analysis is 
applied in the usual way it leads to the (incorrect) definition of excessively narrow markets”.121 This, 
of course, does not mean that a user does not encounter any form of price, when using a search 
engine. The amount of information that an individual user, by simply seeking and accessing certain 
web pages, supplies to the engines in whatever manner, might form a impair the popularity of the 
engine. An engine that purports itself as a fully privacy-safeguarding search service provider might 
have a competitive advantage over the ones that store aggregated or personalized data. However, for 
competition law purposes, these effects are difficult to be measured.
122
 
As proposed by various authors, a different interchangeability test should therefore be applied, in 
order to prevent assessing these markets on characteristics and intended use alone.
123
 In other words, 
currently, the market as concerns the demand side substitutability can only be assessed on the basis 
of the characteristics and intended use of search engines. 
IV.2.3.1.iv. Bishop and Walker analysis 
In general, without disrupting the division in demand-side and supply-side substitutability, Bishop 
and Walker make several remarks as to the antitrust scrutiny for two-sided markets. They warn for 
the all too quick conclusion that two-sided markets need a different appraisal compared to the current 
competition law market share analyses.
124
 
The authors provide, inter alia, the example of supermarkets. They argue them as being two-sided 
markets, yet which are subjected to general antitrust scrutiny.
125
 The definition given to MSP’s in 
this article, however, differs from the one adhered to by Bishop and Walker. A supermarket, 
according to Bishop & Walker is defined as a two-sided market, solely because of network effects: 
the more suppliers provide products to a supermarket, the more customers would be interested in 
visiting the store. In turn, that would have positive influence on new suppliers. Nevertheless, no form 
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of horizontal relationships is being established by the supermarket. A customer of a supermarket is 
not enabled to directly negotiate with the supplier of a certain product.
126
 For instance, on the credit 
card market, a customer is able to directly execute a payment to a merchant via the card; a slightly 
more obscure example, on OS markets, it is possible for end users to exchange software or build 
software for the OS and trade it via the OS. These are enabled direct relations, for which a 
supermarket does not provide.
127
  
Outside of this element, the network effects displayed by supermarkets are not that strong. Every 
marketplace entrant or supermarket exploiter experiences space constraints. As a consequence, only 
up to a certain extent, products can be varied or increased in number. Especially with internet 
businesses, the possible relations that can be established extend to immensely larger proportions, 
amounting to significantly intensified network effects. 
Hence, the statement might be true that one should not think too quickly that any encountered 
two-sided market demands a separate analysis, and that the general rules do not apply. Nevertheless, 
the main concern in the argument made by Bishop and Walker does not seem to lean so heavily on 
the application of the competition law rules, but more on what exactly constitutes a genuine two-
sided market. Therefore, it is logical that Bishop and Walker mention the regular application of 
competition law to supermarkets, because these are no real two-sided markets.
128
  
Considering the argument, however, falling short on substantive evidence, it seems that two-sided 
markets are in need of a separate or new competition law analysis and framework. In order to find 
out if, for the market for online search, this is the case, the research here progresses by elaborating on 
the supply side perspective, from the view of the platform operators that provide the search services. 
IV.2.3.1.v. Supply-side substitutability - barriers to entry 
Whereas the emphasis generally is laid on the demand side substitutability, the supply-side 
substitutability can be a complementing analysis so as to properly define the market.
129
 Separately 
from the demand side substitutability, new entrants next to the existing engines could be willing to 
start providing the same or similar services on the market. In order to establish which online services 
act as substitutes for firms, several barriers to entering the online search market are relevant. 
The particular issues for this criterion are that for new entrants, the proverbial ‘chicken-and-egg’ 
problem arises, as well as that a high degree of particular technical knowledge and expertise is 
demanded, leaving aside even the significant financial investments that have to be made. The 
willingness of new firms to enter this particular market are quite dependent on these hurdles, hence, 
turning them into true potential barriers to entry exist.
130
 
As established, most search services are embedded on a particular website, such as a news 
channel’s website, a legal magazine or an online forum. The hurdles for a supplier of small-scale, 
often vertical, search engine to becoming a horizontal search engine might seem small. With respect 
to necessary coding knowledge, it might not seem difficult to expand the former search services to a 
larger online community, as essentially any search engine has an indexed database of all located 
files, a separate catalogue that both places the indexed pages in an order as well as stores all search 
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requests, and an algorithm/formula that matches the query with the results. However, the platform 
has to engage on a massively larger scale, and would have to take account of various other factors if 
it is willing to compete effectively with existing engines. Both with respect to needed infrastructure, 
as well as specific knowledge of formulating intricate algorithms, large investments are necessary – 
also considering the velocity with which the industry is moving – and can form quite an obstruction 
for entrants. 
In order to become a separate search engine, these smaller engines would need separate web 
space, a proper domain and URL, a new web application, and necessary stable infrastructure that 
allows for the efficient handling of more data traffic. When the difference between offline and online 
cataloguing services are considered, the argument can be raised that for web service providers a large 
portion of this infrastructure and of these elements has already been accomplished. For remoter 
services, such as various offline library or cataloguing services, the financial hurdles could be seen as 
more substantial, rendering those services insufficiently substitutable for Web search engines. 
The specific knowledge and infrastructural requirements have been mentioned for larger firms, in 
order to immediately become established as a significant engine. Nevertheless, the same essentially 
applies for anyone: the specific coding knowledge might be available online, often even actively 
facilitated by the larger market participants,
131
but it does not imply that it is easy to start an online 
web search engine. It demands computational power, a great deal of data storage potential, as well as 
numerous stable connections. 
Contrastingly, the established online search engines provide specific vertical search services 
outside of their own online services. For instance, Yahoo, Bing and Google provide physical 
mapping services of the entire world or significant parts of them, even as close as street level.
132
 
Also, the engines provide small-scale, domain-based vertical search services as well.
133
 Several 
larger websites, forums etc. have a search function that utilises indexing methods by one of the larger 
global search engines. Moreover, Google is known to even ‘enhance’ another broad organic search 
engine, America Online (AOL).
134
 Hence, it appears to be a form of vertical integration that is 
possible for larger corporations, yet reality has not provided examples in which it happened the other 
way round. 
Apart from existing competitors having deep pockets, and despite several structural algorithm 
updates having been published, a new entrant will also encounter various potentially crucial patents, 
regulatory barriers, such as Google’s pivotal PageRank. Also, a large degree of uncertainty relating 
to the competition’s engines and algorithms still remains intact. Not only is it alleged that, for 
instance, Google updates its algorithms 500 to 600 times a year,
135
 many of the (200) factors 
incorporated in its search algorithm remain undisclosed. Any form of reverse engineering for 
competitors is, therefore, highly complicated, making competition constantly susceptible to change 
and innovation.
136
 This would significantly rule in favour of Google’s practices, and the search 
engines industry in general. 
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Therefore, to only a small extent, other service providers can or are willing to switch so as to 
become an online search engine and vice versa; such would seem to enlarge the defined market to a 
small extent. Nevertheless, other barriers to entry, for instance switching costs, have a say in the full 
supply-side substitutability. In essence, switching costs are factors to be taken into account with 
demand-side substitutability,
137
 yet they are also convenient when it comes to assessing the market 
from a supply-side perspective. As mentioned by the Market Definition Notice of the EC, if 
substantial obstacles to switching demand exist, “the Commission will not consider two prima facie 
demand substitutes as belonging to one single product market”.138 
IV.2.3.1.vi. Is competition one click away? 
“If our users don’t like what we’re doing, they can easily switch to a competitor with just one click. 
We think users should be able to move their personal data to competing services, and we take 
measures to earn our users’ loyalty by building good products and continually improving them, not 
by locking in users artificially.”139 
This statement on one of Google’s websites makes it seem as though competition for a majority of 
the customers is not only facilitated by engines, but is also actively pursued by consumers. The 
ability to switch to a competitor incorporates both concepts of potential and actual competition. It 
implies the idea of switching costs for consumers. If it is extremely difficult or economically 
disadvantageous to switch from one search engine to another, consumers might not be inclined to 
switch. Hence, it would become unattractive for a newcomer to enter the market, since the clientele 
is ‘locked’ in.140 At the same time, the adagio states that the only cost for a customer to switch would 
be a single click: if that holds true, it would amount to nearly naught costs, and make the market 
highly volatile and more lucrative for new entrants. 
First of all, it holds true that all search engines facilitate the direct finding of the competitors.
141
 A 
simple entered query and a click is essentially all it takes for an end user to locate and use a 
competitor’s services. Therefore, the possibility for a customer to switch is not actively impeded by 
any competitor; however, other forces are at play that could impede or prevent actual switching. 
Whereas the mentioned costs are focused on the customer or consumer, if he or she is locked-in, 
this would also affect new competitors, making it a barrier to entry. In online search, the foremost 
consumer-related barriers to entry involve the existence of network effects. As the formulated 
algorithms enable a constantly evolving (and potentially self-improving) searching experience, 
consumers will keep benefiting directly from using one engine only. The likeliness of finding the 
correct result is decreased whenever customers switch, which is why network effects are also called 
demand-side economies of scale.
142
 Switching customers would therefore not only be detrimental to 
the improvement of an online search engine service, but also to that individual user’s experience. 
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It might be that the consumer has insufficient knowledge of such technological developments, as 
the changes in experience are gradual and minor.
143
 This could, therefore, limit network effects; 
however, this unawareness can be connected to the fact that the bulk of searches are basic, short 
queries which often simply pertain to the name of a particular website, such as “Facebook” or 
“Yahoo!”144. For this substantial bulk of non-complicated queries, consumer inertia has an impeding 
effect on competition, as there is no logical reason to switch to a different or new search engine, 
when the former delivers exactly the same results. By and large, such affirms the network effects and 
raises switching costs. 
However, the term “switching” in this sense might not be wholly appropriate, because switching 
seems as if a customer abandons one provider and fully opts for another. Especially in markets of 
these and other freely accessible web services, users are prone to using more than one engine 
simultaneously. It is an effect that is often described as multi-homing, a term originally used in IP-
computing theory, to define a network or system being connected to two or more separate internet 
providers: in case one of those connections failed, the other would still be running, hence making it 
possible to remain connected and continuously reachable.
145
 The same is the case for the search 
platform market, and for various other MSP markets, such as for credit cards and OS software.
146
 
Multi-homing is generally associated with network effects.
147
 The latter will be strengthened, in 
absence of the former. The association has everything to do with interoperability. For instance, 
individual telecommunication networks experience decreased network effects, when end user A, for 
the same price, can reach both end user B on the home network, and C on an external network, which 
is exploited by a different provider. With regard to connectivity, it does not matter for any of the 
customers which network to choose, as all can reach one another. The interoperability between the 
multiple networks hence decreases the positive influence any network individually has on customers. 
This means that being active on more than one network is detrimental to active participants on either 
network, provided that both are equal in size.
148
 Interoperability decreases multi-homing costs, yet 
multi-homing decreases network effects.
149
 
Indeed, the aforementioned argument that search engines facilitate searching for and finding of 
competitors counts in favour of low multi-homing costs for end users. Also, there appears to be 
evidence that customers actually are multi-homing.
150
 Moreover, on every search engine, any 
competitor is shown as top result, meaning every search term for the competition, upon request, 
inevitably leads to the competition. On top of that, no financial barrier to switch is imposed on an 
end user. Therefore, in theory at least, barriers between competitors do not appear to exist; such 
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would then also point towards a highly volatile market. This will be further covered in the part 
covering dominance under Art. 102 TFEU. 
Some final remarks which will also return in the section on dominance, concern first the currently 
strong affection that large online search engines show towards introducing new services and 
integrating these in the main service.
151
 This is a phenomenon described by Richard Posner as the 
New Economy, in which established services, in order to remain competitive, are linked to new 
services, reinforcing the potentially dominant position of the main service. For instance, if a 
consumer were to switch completely from Google to another service provider, the specific 
services/products he would miss are for instance accounts (for storage, or for e-mail), the indexed 
database, the historically built-up, personalised data information of the searcher, therefore the 
entirely personalised searching experience it might not have at the competitor’s. 
Secondly, high-technology markets such as the one Google is active on are known to ‘tip’ towards 
one undertaking or platform.
152
 This usually means that consumers grow aware of one undertaking 
being the most developed, and choose to adopt its technology.
153
 For instance, the search engine 
market in the EU seems completely swamped by Google’s influence, whereas the US market 
displays a more dispersed image, with other competitors.
154
 Therefore, consumers are prone to 
inertia, and freely locking themselves in. Various reasons are possible, since numerous non-price 
related switching costs are possible to be applied in the generalised online search industries. 
IV.2.3.1.vii. Conclusion on the relevant product market 
Regarding the difficulties in exactly defining the relevant market for MSP firms such as Google, 
competition law agencies also appear to be in a quandary. A more economic and thorough manner of 
assessing a market would be preferred, yet is not consistently applied. This ‘more economic 
approach’ by the European Commission is generally associated with a more consumer welfare-
oriented method. It judges the effects of conduct by undertakings, instead of merely focussing on the 
static market definitions. Also, academics are not unison on whether or not such a static market 
analysis should be applied at all.
155
 
Still, to give the following some footing, it is appropriate to define the market as narrow as the 
following. Optimally, the definition of the relevant market incorporates the horizontal or generalised 
tracing/crawling, caching, and indexing of websites, the display and generation of search results on 
the basis of entered queries in an online application that provides for adjacent advertising. 
On the basis of these characteristics, it is possible to distinguish this market from various vertical 
search providers, such as Facebook, Expedia, or MapQuest. Also, it distinguishes this market 
sufficiently from the numerous smaller intranet (vertical) search service providers, from cataloguing 
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and information organizing entities, such as physical libraries or printed encyclopaedia, and from 
other ‘offline’ data centres, for instance multiple advertisement supported data carriers (TV and 
Newspapers). Even though for both end users and hypothetical competitors, these and other service 
could be considered as substitutes for the services on this market, they are sufficiently separated from 
it. From here onwards, the entities active on the market will, therefore, be referred to as either 
“horizontal online search engines (HOSEs)” or “generalised online search engines (GOSEs)”. 
Nevertheless, before allocating market shares to the entities concerned, the entities should be 
designated by ways of the relevant geographic market. 
IV.2.3.2. The relevant geographic market. 
The second element of the market definition relates to its geographic scope. The Commission Notice 
states on this the following: '[t]he relevant geographic market comprises the area in which the 
undertakings concerned are involved in the supply and demand of products or services, in which the 
conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from 
neighbouring areas because the conditions of competition are appreciably different in those area”.156 
For horizontal online search engines, the market is operational on a worldwide scale, not only 
because the mentioned engines are reachable from all over the world, but are also utilised in every 
part of the world.  
In various parts of the world, other GOSEs are active that would match the criteria as set above, 
such as the Chinese Baidu, the Russian Yandex, or America Online. These, however, are not 
incorporated in this assessment, because they compete only on their respective territory with the 
worldwide search engines. As a consequence, the following competitors can be defined: Yahoo! 
Search, Microsoft’s Bing, and Google Search, as these all operate on a global scale. 
IV.3. Is Google Inc. dominant? 
The case law explained in par. IV.2.2. seems to elucidate the concept “dominance” in quite elaborate 
sentences. Nevertheless, these generally do not serve as a handle for assessing dominance in every 
Article 102 TFEU case. Despite the rulings, dominance is regarded as “nebulous”157, “not self-
explanatory”,158 and even interpreted as impossibly to be proven definitively by competition 
authorities or by private parties.
159
 As a consequence, competition authorities and legal academics in 
the literature devised their own methods for grappling with this concept. Below, five of these will be 
described and discussed, not in the first place to draw a benchmark with which the remainder of the 
research is compared, but also to exemplify the disunity among the various authors and the general 
legal uncertainty for potentially dominant companies. The latter will be elucidated further in the 
subsequent sections, concerning the difficulty on allocating market shares in online search, as well 
on various barriers to entry. A scrutiny of, inter alia, network effects, multi-homing, and 
interoperability, as discussed in chapter III, will return in that section on the assessment of 
dominance in the case-law of the EU. 
IV.3.1. Five perspectives on dominance. 
First, the European Commission in its Enforcements Priorities Guidance Communication puts heavy 
emphasis on the ability to raise prices.
160
 It opens the section on the assessment of dominance, 
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designated as “Market power”, with the reiteration of the standing law in Michelin, UBC & HLR.161 
It follows with the consideration that a dominant undertaking is one “which is capable of profitably 
increasing prices above the competitive level for a significant period of time.”162 In short, the 
Commission regards the ability to change price as the prevailing interpretation for a dominant 
position.
163
 Moreover, price is interpreted as shorthand for other factors of competition, such as 
output, innovation, variety or quality of products. 
The second interpretation is given by Jones & Sufrin, who touch upon dominance fairly 
superficially: they regard that dominance is generally interpreted as “substantial market power which 
enables the undertaking concerned to profitably raise prices about (sic) the competitive level over a 




As a third, Whish & Bailey read in the case law of the ECJ on a dominant position that dominance 
is equal to the economic concept of (substantial) market power.
166
 Furthermore, earlier on in their 
book, they refer to market power, next to the power over price, as also including “other ways in 
which competition can be restricted, for example […] limiting output, suppressing innovation, 
reducing the variety or quality of goods or services or […] depriving consumers of choice, all of 
which are clearly inimical to consumer welfare”.167 This seems to be derived directly from par. 11 of 
the Communication from the Commission Guidance Communication. 
Fourth, Bishop & Walker depart from the same logic, by equating dominance with (significant) 
market power.
168
 Their definition of market power, on the one hand, contains “the ability of a firm or 
group of firms to raise price, through the restriction of output, above the level that would prevail 
under competitive conditions and thereby to enjoy increased profits from the actions”.169  
On the other hand, as opposed to pricing power, both authors tend to a different form of 
dominance, one which has received attention in US competition policy, namely exclusionary 
power.
170
 The US Supreme Court in the case US v. Du Pont of 1956, stated that “monopoly power is 
the power to control prices or exclude competition”, and has since then been used as a test for 
dominance.
171
 Krattenmaker, Lande & Salop turned these into two methods of anticompetitive 
power, namely “raising one’s own prices or raising competitors’ costs”.172 Bishop and Walker find 
this second role also compatible with the ECJ rulings, regarding “the power to act independently” as 
being equal to “the notion of being able to exclude competitors”.173 
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The fifth and final perspective in this comparison is Nazzini’s chapter on single dominance.174 In 
it, he interprets the definition somewhat along the line of Bishop & Walker’s exclusionary power, 
and he gives arguably the most comprehensive (and complex) view on the establishment of 
dominance under current EU Competition law. He describes two models by which he believes 
dominance is to be defined. The one he explains as a structuralist model, equal to substantial and 
durable market power, the other as a more behavioural, dynamic model, defining dominance “as the 
ability to harm competition”.175 The structuralist model he derives from the case law of UBC, 
Hoffmann-La Roche and of the Court of First Instance’s (CFI) ruling in General Electric.176 The 
behavioural model is the application by analogy of the ability to harm competition as used in non-
horizontal merger cases to the concept of dominance in the abuse of dominance terminology.
177
 
The distinction between these models is derived from the Court’s teleological reasoning in its 
United Brands ruling.
178
 However, despite him introducing them as separate models by which to 
assess dominance, Nazzini intertwines the models around the word “independently” in the ruling.179 
On the relationship, he states: “[t]he ability for a firm with no substantial and durable market power 
to harm competition is too remote a possibility to justify the risk of error and over-deterrence that the 
application of Article 102 to any firm with some degree of market power would entail. Many firms 
are capable of profitably increasing prices above the competitive level but would be unlikely to have 
the ability to harm long-term social welfare.” In other words, it is necessary for applying Art. 102 
TFEU that a threshold exists for grading market power. The “risk of error and over-deterrence” 
Nazzini mentions, refers to also known as Type 1 errors, or false positives.
180
 
This reasoning links with the idea of introducing a more economic approach in the application of 
article 102 TFEU. To be in favour of this approach, which essentially consists of a consumer 
welfare-led effects-based analysis with respect to article 102 TFEU, would entail wanting to abandon 
static legal concepts and frameworks; antitrust should, instead, predominantly take account of 
(economic) effects of certain behaviour on a market in order to come to a prohibition.
181
 Notably, 
effects in this sense entail the consequences of certain market conduct, and, therefore, ‘effects-based’ 




Furthermore, this ‘more economic approach’, is regarded, on the one hand, as a potential solution 
to over-enforcement of competition rules and as a safeguard against type 1 errors.
183
 On the other, 
however, as indicated by Nazzini amongst others, the approach might also cause exactly those same 
errors by only focusing on effects, which would make legal concepts such as dominance a necessary 
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 Moreover, complex and time-consuming economic tests might not be workable for national 
competition authorities, as they experience budgetary constraints. This is then likely to lead to under-
enforcement or type 2 errors, so-called false negatives.
185
 
It could, therefore, be argued that there is no reason to change from predominant perspective in 
antitrust law, as the more economic approach, in one way or the other, results in the same potential 
errors.
186
 The application of Art. 102 TFEU in the more economic sense or not, would then both lead 
to prevention of false positives, as well as false negatives. The relevance for the research at hand is 
that the above explains the disparity in interpretations that the law and case law gives rise to, and the 
various perspectives that researchers provide. These definitions embody the same ambivalence at 
which generally European competition law is applied.
187
 And that might be problematic with regard 
to the rule of law on which the European Union is based, as well as to the climate for undertakings in 
the EU in general.
188
 
Nevertheless, the effect of a lack of any strict interpretations of competition rules might be that 
potential dominant undertakings act more on their toes, in order not to infringe the rules. Fines are or 
can be extensive and the threat of being fined would amount to higher subservience to the law, 
whatever its contents may be.
189
 This, for instance, might also explain the settlement culture that 
Google has taken with regard to various cases, for instance with the offered commitments the 




IV.3.2. Does pricing power determine dominance? 
Currently, the main interpretation on dominance attributes a strong role to an undertaking’s influence 
on the price of the product.
191
 This interpretation, however, seems to focus on those industries in 
which competition on price is more or less self-evident. In novel industries such as Google’s, direct 
or fixed prices on provided services are next to impossibly attributable. They differ per query, per 
moment, per region, per advertiser and per so many other factors that are weighed in the ultimate 
establishment of the price, and essentially are not paid for by the search results themselves, but only 
for the clicks that sponsored search results deliver. Therefore, if competition law agencies wish to 
deal with these new industries, that basic notion underlying Art. 102 TFEU analyses should be 
reappraised. Especially with the Google platform, the focus on price or output does not seem to be 
the correct assessment method, and should therefore be abandoned. 
Considering that the Court has not been so straightforward in its definition in UBC, authors or 
authorities that believe the above interpretation is the prevailing one as regards the assessment of 
dominance should all the more reappraise their definition. The manner, namely, in which in UBC the 
idea of acting independently of competitors, customers and consumers was introduced, is a broader 
one than merely interpretable as price-setting, output-reducing or innovation-controlling capabilities 
of a firm, which idea will be set out below. 
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IV.3.3. Market shares 
In general, market shares are used and interpreted as a general indication of market power.
192
 In 
several cases, moreover, it has been decided by the Courts that the larger a share of the market an 
undertaking has, the lower the threshold will be for a presumption of dominance.
193
 However, the 
Commission acknowledged in the WorldCom/MCI Merger Decision that, at least for Internet 
revenues, “the absence of consistent reporting standards for data which is produced, means that there 
is no reliable publicly available estimate of the size of either the Internet sector as a whole or of any 




Competition in online search exists on various aspects, such as the number of searchers, of queries 
and of associated accounts; however, the easiest method for allocating market shares, is the one 
based on turnover, in this case specifically the turnover or revenue gained through electronic 
advertising. As also indicated by the WorldCom Decision, especially with regard to the online 
industries at hand, general market share analysis poses difficulties. First, it only makes sense to 
allocate shares, when a relevant market has been defined.
196
 Considering that the GOSE market 
analysis does not have such a solid basis, an assessment of the market shares also loses traction. 
Secondly, market shares are generally based on firms’ turnovers in a predefined period, usually of 
one calendar year.
197
 As the money-making aspect of the platforms available in online search is 
online advertisement, it seems reasonable to allocate shares on the basis of the revenue in online 
search advertising. However, the turnover in online advertising by the companies is not with all 
competitors fully generated by ways of the supplied GOSE service.
198
 For instance, Microsoft’s Bing 
Search is a vertically integrated undertaking under Microsoft; hence, the turnover made by Microsoft 
in the advertising industry might not be fully attributable to Bing. Also, Yahoo! and Bing operate in 
a combined advertisers marketplace, the Yahoo Bing Network, in which also firms as Facebook, 
Amazon, Monster, or networks such as The Wall Street Journal Digital Network are incorporated.
199
 
Lastly, if turnover is not a good method by ways of which to address market shares for GOSEs, 
other aspects, such as the number of executed searches or number of end users, are also 
troublesome.
200
 For instance, when calculating the number of searches per engine, these fluctuate per 
day, and, what is more, billions are executed per day. Also, most searches are not to be designated as 
high-quality, because they serve as link-through queries to websites such as Facebook or other. 
Another example would be the number of search users. One could calculate the number of searchers 
for each respective search engine and allocate market shares on the basis of that. However, this 
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would also be unsatisfactory, because the industry is prone to the aforementioned multi-homing, 
which will be discussed more thoroughly in the following of this chapter. 
Whereas the Court has considered market share analysis in itself as not decisive in the assessment 
of dominance,
201
 it still remains a point of departure. And even though for the GOSE industry it is a 
difficult hurdle, in the current research, market shares have been calculated and addressed on the 
basis of quarterly turnover of the last five years in the online advertising industry, simply to give an 
indication of scope. See Table 5 and the accompanying Diagram 15. 
 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Yahoo
202
 $1.786  $1.575  $1.601  $1.217  $1.201  $1.139  
MS Bing
203
 $603  $843  $566  $667  $707  $832  
Google
204
 $5.351  $5.756  $7.032  $9.335  $10.860  $12.542  
Total  $8.069  $8.531  $9.849  $11.873  $13.762  $15.959  
Diagram 9. Market Shares of Online Search Engines, on Third Quarterly Revenues in millions 
IV.3.4. Barriers to entry. 
Considering the difficulty of appropriately defining the market in the GOSE industries, it becomes 
complicated to allocate market shares. It appears that the relationship between the market shares and 
the industries of the current research is too rigid and static.
205
 Attaching a percentage to a competitor 
does not give any insight in the competitive forces that the particular competitor endures. Also, 
considering the market’s volatility, an image of the GOSE market of today might not likely reflect an 
image of the market tomorrow. This all the more justifies a stronger role to be attributed to the 
factors that exist aside of market shares, rendering individual market share calculation less 
significant. 
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For example, Nazzini’s market power methods intricately account for this, as well. The two 
Nazzini methods, as derived from the UBC ruling, are intertwined by the word “independently”: this 
means that an undertaking should have “economic strength”, be able to influence or harm 
competition and be able to do so, independently.
206
 That last word indicates “the inability of the 
rational market conduct of rivals, customers, and ultimately, consumers to prevent the dominant 
undertaking from harming competition”.207 Independence, therefore, adheres to the contestability of 
the market
208
 and of the undertaking’s position.209 This would again come down to barriers to entry 
of the GOSE market, with a specific relevance for the undertaking’s, i.e. Google’s, position. 
In general, a market that experiences low barriers to entry weakens the position of a potentially 
dominant undertaking, because then, more undertakings are incentivised to enter that market, and 
larger pressure will rest on existing competitors for maintaining their position.
210
 Barriers to entry 
have already been covered in the part on establishing the relevant market. Now, the influence of the 
barriers to entry, specifically as far as network effects are concerned, should be applied to the GOSE 
market. This will entail a reasoning that incorporates developed market entities as regards technology 
and financial progress, network effects themselves, multi-homing, adoption of technologies and 
market tipping, interoperability, and a novel method, which will be designated as networked 
innovation. 
IV.3.4.1. Technology and financial progress. 
The existence of economically and technologically advanced undertakings reinforces their own 
position. The GOSE market seems to have this threshold, not only with regard to available 
knowledge, but also regarding the infrastructure that is needed in order to run such an operation.
211
 
This concentration of technical expertise, of economic and structural resources poses large initial 
investments for entering, competing platforms. The threshold, moreover, becomes all the higher over 
time, as innovation in these industries seems to take exponential leaps in current day and age.
212
 
Hence, Google could be experienced as a behemoth to new entrants, considering its potentially 
superior algorithm, numerous other online services, the number of takeovers and its numerous 
updates of those services, which could deter entry. 
IV.3.4.2. Network effects. 
A market that experiences strong network effects strengthens the position of any existing competitor, 
making it more complicated for new entrants to conquer ground in that market. The case law has not 
come up with many examples in which network effects are sufficiently addressed. Below, however, 
some cases and several decisions will be researched, that give rise to a growing awareness with the 
Courts and European Commission of the importance of network effect analysis. The cases are the 
following, covering MasterCard and its interchange fee, Microsoft and its illegal tying and 
interoperability practices, the Microsoft/Skype Merger Decision as well as the Skype case. 
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The first example from the case law is the MIF case.
213
 It was referred to by Jones & Sufrin under 
the heading of two-sided market analyses being used in European Court rulings.
214
 It concerned a 
case of a decision by an association of undertakings, MasterCard Inc., a case that would be relevant 
for the application of Art. 101, par. 1 and 3 TFEU; still, the considerations on network effects might 
also pose some valuable insights for the analysis of dominance. This ruling focused on so-called 
interchange fees charged for cross-border payments via credit card networks. In short, interchange 
fees are levies on credit card payment transactions, paid between banks.
215
 
A credit card in itself constitutes a two-sided market: as more merchants allow for paying via 
credit card, the more attractive it becomes for consumers to acquire and purchase with such a card 
and vice versa. In the words of the Court, “the extent of merchants’ acceptance of cards and the 
number of cards in circulation each affects the other”.216 However, this reasoning merely 
exemplifies a so-called closed payment cards system, where cardholders and merchants directly act 
via the credit card agent.
217
 Conversely, in an open payment cards system, credit card companies 
charge royalties and membership fees to two types of financial institutions. The first type are issuing 
banks that have a relationship with the cardholders, and the other type are acquiring banks that have 
a relationship with merchants.
218
 With every payment from a card holder to a merchant, the Issuing 
bank transfers the money to the acquiring bank, which then transfers it to the merchant. However, a 
certain percentage of the transferred sum is deduced as fee for the credit card service by the 
acquiring bank. Of that deduced percentage, a portion is sent to the issuing bank (the interchange 
fee). Consequently, the acquiring bank is paid by the Issuing bank See Diagram 10 for a graphic 
exemplification of such an open system. 
Essentially, the entire market consists of two two-sided markets: one is upstream, involving the 
two types of banks, and one is downstream, involving merchants and cardholders.
219
 On the 
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upstream market, different card schemes compete so as to persuade the financial institutions to adopt 
their network. On the downstream market, the banks offer the complete payment services to 
consumers. Hence, network effects act also on the upstream level: the more issuing banks exist, the 
more attractive it will become for another bank to become an acquiring bank in the credit card 
operator’s network, and vice versa.220  
The General Court did not take notice of this point. Rather on the contrary, the GC opined that the 
sides of that particular market should not be considered conjointly, because the services provided to 
cardholders and to merchants can be distinguished and holders and merchants exert separate 
competitive pressures on the two respective types of banks.
221
 Essentially, in this case, the existence 
of network effects seemed not to be relevant for the assessment of the market.
222
  
In the recent appeal procedure, however, the ECJ, nuanced the GC judgment, by stating that “the 
economic and legal context of the coordination concerned includes […] the two-sided nature of 
Mastercard’s open payment system, particularly since it is undisputed that there is interaction 
between the two sides of that system.”223 Nevertheless, the Court did not continue with assessing this 
criterion, as the arguments raised by the parties concerned the pro-competitive aspects of the MIF, 
which cannot be raised in the assessment under art. 101 par. 1 TFEU. 
Similarly, the recent appeal in the Groupement des Cartes Bancaires case, covered the importance 
of markets with a two-sided nature. It concerned a similar credit card system as in MIF, and 
particular agreements by the Groupement, three so-called pricing measures as regards the activities 
of issuing banks were regarded as restrictions by object under the current Art. 101 par 1 TFEU.
224
 
The Commission defined the relevant market as that for issuing payment cards. Under Art. 101 par. 1 
TFEU, the coordination in question should be assessed according to “the content of its provisions, its 
objectives and the economic and legal context” in which it can be placed.225 Further, the “nature of 
the goods or services affected” should be incorporated in such an assessment, and also “the real 
conditions of the functioning and structure of the market or markets in question”.226 The particular 
relevant phrase in this sense, the ECJ specifies that “all relevant aspects of the economic and legal 
context of the coordination under consideration, “all the more so, when, as in the present case, there 
are interactions between the two facets of a two-sided system”.227 
Even though these decisions by the Courts of the EU have been made with regard to assessments 
under Art. 101 TFEU, and they concern a different (two-sided) market, they could have implications 
for the dominance assessment under art. 102 TFEU. For Google Inc. that could entail that, more 
specifically under a contestability analysis, all sides of the platform have to be considered. Such a 
reasoning, hence, has significant consequences for the current assessment in the Google 
Commitments procedure, with regard to the alleged abusive behaviour. The market for advertising, 
and the market for provision of content should not be allowed to be construed separately from one 
another, but judged as a whole. 
A next case in point where network effects played a crucial role is Microsoft and the tying of its 
media player software to its operating system Windows, and the refusal to supply interoperability 
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information of Windows to other systems.
228
 The facts of Microsoft revolve around two markets: one 
market concerned client PC operating systems (OS). The Decision and the Court ruling defined an 
OS as “‘system software’ which controls the basic functions of the computer and enables the user to 
make use of the computer and run application software on it”.229 To the non-technologically skilled 
consumer, an OS itself is practically useless. Application software has to be installed and executed 
on it. Hence, the chicken-and-egg issue here plays between software developers and customers. The 
more applications that are available for a particular OS, the more attractive it becomes for consumers 
to buy and utilise the OS. Again, this is an example of indirect network effects. 
The other market concerned work group server systems. Those were defined as “operating 
systems designed and marketed to deliver collectively ‘basic infrastructure services’ to relatively 
small numbers of client PCs connected to small or medium-sized networks”.230 On that market, the 
network effects relate to the availability of technicians, or system operators, who are capable of 
maintaining the network and the necessary software. The easier it is for a group of customers to 
acquire a skilled technician, the higher the inclination to purchase a work group server system; the 
other way round, a technician would be more willing to become skilled at providing maintenance 
services of that particular type of software, if the OS is a popular product.
231
  
In the EC Decision, which was confirmed by the CFI judgment, the existence of network effects 
was seen as the pivotal barrier to entry, both to the client PC operating systems and to the work 
group servers market: “[t]he nature of the barriers to entry in the client PC operating system market 
serves to reinforce the conclusion that Microsoft holds a dominant position in this market. These 
barriers to entry derive from the network effects in the market”.232 In the ruling, the CFI stated that  
“those network effects derive, first, from the fact that users like platforms on which they can use a 
large number of applications and, second, from the fact that software designers write applications for 
the client PC operating systems that are the most popular among users”.233 
In all, the above seems to indicate that network effects are important factors which can reinforce 
or establish a dominant undertaking. However, the case law is currently too thin from which to fully 
derive a standing rule. Moreover, as the following will show, the establishment of network effects 
itself is not sacrosanct for dominance, economically speaking. 
Further, as established with respect to Google, on multiple sides of the platform network effects 
are extant. As covered in section III.3.4, direct network effects among end users entering queries 
algorithmically reinforce the use of the search engine for new end users; also, indirect network 
effects among end users and websites, among web sites and advertisers, and among advertisers and 
users reinforce the addition of actors on all sides. This could augment a large market share to 
potential dominance of Google in the GOSE market. 
IV.3.4.3. Multi-homing. 
A highly recent case, in which Microsoft was also a notable player, is Skype. The Skype case is an 
example of multi-homing, and is the first case in which the Court uses this terminology.
234
 In 
general, a market that experiences strong multi-homing effects weakens individual network effects, 
and with it, weakens the position of a potentially dominant firm. This is sensible, because if a 
consumer opts for using two networks instead of one, both networks gain a user; as a consequence, 
both networks benefit equally, though neither receives an advantage over the other. In Skype, the 
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General Court assessed this phenomenon by examining the filed application by two firms for 
annulment of the Commission Decision that approved the takeover of Skype by Microsoft.
235
 
The relevant facts concerned two markets, one for internet-based communications services aimed 
at the general public and one for those aimed at undertakings. A particular feature of the markets, 
which is also relevant for the current Google investigation, is that “most of the services are provided 
for free”.236 With regard to the merged entity, the General Court says the following: “[i]n so far as 
users expect to receive consumer communications services free of charge, the potential for the new 
entity to set its pricing policy freely is significantly restricted.”237 Also, “if the new entity decided to 
stop innovating in terms of its communications services, it would also run the risk of reducing their 
attractiveness given the level of innovation on the market in question”.238 In other words, in this 
particular trade, a large firm cannot be considered dominant, irrespective of its (current) market 
share, when it cannot change price or reduce the degree of innovation to its benefit. 
The General Court, subsequently, proceeds with assessing the network effects.
239
 Network effects 
in voice and video communication software markets are direct: the more users a piece of audio or 
video messaging software has, the more attractive it becomes for new users to join, hence existing 
users attract the same type of users. This could reinforce a dominant position. The GC rightfully 
acknowledges that competing platforms experience the same effects, which therefore, not necessarily 
detract from a dominant network. Nevertheless, the reasoning the GC adheres to is most likely only 
applicable to a market with equally-sized networks. If a large network, however, competes with a 
smaller network, it will be more favourable for new users to ‘adopt’ the network with the largest user 
base. This will be further discussed, below. 
The Commission utilised Facebook data to state that users engage in regular two-way interaction 
with four to six people.
240
 This information, however, says nothing about which four to six people 
are communicating. Person A1 might communicate with acquaintances A2 to A6; however, friend A2 
might communicate with friend A1 and persons B1 to B5, accounting for a completely different group. 
Hence, the conclusion by the Commission that, therefore, groups can easily move between services 
does not strike root.
241
 The decision to switch networks will predominantly be an individual decision 
and not by groups as a whole. The General Court seems to acknowledge this, by stating that “no 
economic or technical obstacle” exists that either prevents small groups switching or prevents users 
from simultaneously using more than one piece of communication software.
242
 Subsequently, the 
GC, relying on the information provided by the Commission’s Decision, acknowledges multi-




A consecutive, potentially controversial, consideration by the General Court is given in par. 96 of 
the Skype case. It states that, despite earlier decisions by the Commission, the case in point was not 
characterised by “the presence of technical or economic constraints preventing users from 
downloading several communications software programs at the same time”. The Court is arguably 
sufficiently clear in distinguishing this case from the Microsoft (Tying & Interoperability) case.
244
 
However, essentially, that same phrase seems to be applicable to the case of Microsoft’s Windows 
Media Player having been decided upon as illegally tied to its Windows OS. At the time of those 
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 consumers on the WWW surely would have advanced enough, to such an extent as to 
not be constrained from downloading and using various existing (free) media players. At that time, 
internet access had become widely available and an increasing number of people had started 
downloading files and software from the WWW. Still, the Commission opined that “downloading is 
not a channel which can be compared in efficiency to […] pre-installation.”246 
Arguably, therefore, the Commission, as confirmed by the General Court,
247
 jumps to conjectural 
conclusions in the two cases with regard to network effects and multi-homing. It construes network 
effects, that legally, technically, and economically are not proven. Proper evidence, ruling out the 
possibility that multi-homing exists on the market lacks in the Commission’s and Court’s 
assessment. As a consequence of this ambivalence, it is up until now entirely uncertain what the law 
entails with regard to network effects and multi-homing. With respect to the rule of law, this is an 
extremely undesirable situation; moreover, it is a situation that in the longer term might have 
detrimental consequences for the climate for businesses in the EU.
248
  
With regard to Skype, possible tying or bundling situations were also considered.
249
 However, it 
was decided that many alternatives to Skype exist,
250
 and people increasingly prefer online 
messaging services that are “part of a broader user experience”, such as Facebook, Google+, et 
cetera.
251
 This rendered bundling and tying as not impeding consumer harm.
252
 Hence, arguably, 
these circumstances did not exist to such an extent for WMP at its respective time. Furthermore, a 
part of the decision on declaring the tying of WMP illegal was the option that it could not be 
uninstalled.
253
 Also, the decision shows an emphasis on the aim of protecting competitors, and not of 
consumers. Irrespective of the software being provided for free, alternative suppliers will be at a 
competitive disadvantage if consumers receive WMP as directly tied to Windows.
254
 Hence, it might 
be that the actual harm to consumers was fully equal to what was regarded by the Commission in the 
Microsoft/Skype Merger Decision. 
Considering the increased availability of multiple music streaming, downloading, and sharing 
apps, websites and programs, nowadays, it could be argued that under current economic and 
technological developments, Microsoft would be allowed to tie a media player to its OS. Still, it 
would be infringing the old Decision. That would, apart inconsistent logic, not account for any legal 
certainty for undertakings in the European Union. 
In short, as can be derived from the case law until thus far, network effects can and seemingly will 
have a significant role in the assessments of dominance, both in the Decisions of the Commission, as 
in the rulings of the Courts. Furthermore, considering that also multi-homing is becoming a point of 
reference in the assessments, this points at a more economic approach, that moves further away from 
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original static market (share) analysis and more towards (potential) effects on the market. The 
aforementioned rules and extrapolations of the rulings and decisions also seem to point at a high 
threshold before regarding Google as a dominant undertaking, let alone the conduct that the company 
displays as being abusive. It remains to be seen in future cases what the prevailing stance of EU 
Competition Law will be on network effects and multi-homing. Moreover, some potentially relevant 
aspects for assessing dominance are covered neither in the rulings, nor in the Decisions. These are 
adoption of technologies and market tipping, and networked innovations, which concepts will be 
addressed in the following sections. Subsequently, the recent Google commitments procedure is 
covered. 
IV.3.4.4. Adoption and Market tipping  
A market where the chance of ‘tipping’, depending on whether a current form of technology, a 
product, or something else is adopted by the designated audience, is present, can establish a 
dominant undertaking, almost in the sense of a natural monopoly.
255
 The idea of markets tipping is 
another consequence of network effects.
256
 As networks grow in size, more users will be attracted to 
that particular platform. Economically, this can be explained with the incremental benefit increase: 
as the network increases in size, the benefit that any new user would derive from the network is 
sufficiently larger than that same user would have at the much smaller network. A large network, 
logically, attracts more users at the same time, than a tiny network will. The positive feedback loops 
that network effects entail, hence, support this tipping process. 
In some instances, adoption of a particular technology or product becomes factual standard, such 
as happened with the VHS tapes and DVD discs.
257
 Both this and the risk of markets tipping are 
economic factors that, up until now, the Courts have not regarded as relevant. For instance, the 
assessment of the Skype action for annulment did not lead to such an interpretation.
258
 On the 
contrary, the General Court in Skype has not progressed beyond merely identifying market shares, 
network effects, and multi-homing.
259
 
Tipping markets can be detrimental to innovation of the particular product, because, when, for 
some reason or other, end users favour a piece of technology that is inferior on its technological 
sophistication, and the market tips towards that undertaking, a different piece of potentially superior 
technology in that respect might become lost. The tipped market entity might, then, also not have the 
incentive to innovate further.
260
 Furthermore, when many people adopt that technology, it becomes 
difficult for a competing, more sophisticated product to conquer ground.
261
 By and large, network 
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effects prevent users from switching or starting to use a product that has a small user base, yet that is 
in and of itself a better product.
262
 
The further risk is that the tipped market will abandon the original market and the innovations that 
came with it, entailing a locked-in new market from which returning is a difficult option.
263
 An 
example for this is of newer computer hardware currently not being equipped any longer with CD- or 
DVD-reading technology, arguably because the majority of people streams their music online, 
downloads software or stores all its information in ‘the cloud’. The risk of a market tipping would 
therefore be a considerable factor to take into account in dominance assessments.
264
 For certain 
Member States in the European Union, for instance, the presence and utilization by end users of 
Google on the market for GOSEs seems to indicate a tipped market in favour of the company.
265
 
Still, it does not necessarily mean that a tipped market is a dominance market, or that a company is 
fully to blame for the behaviour of, inert, consumers. 
IV.3.4.5. Interoperability. 
As a final point, interoperability is noteworthy to mention for assessing dominance.
266
 A market that 
has a high degree of interoperability among various networks, platforms, or engines, will experience 
decreased individual network effects, a lower chance of tipping and therefore a lower chance of 
creating or sustaining dominance.
267
 For example, if a consumer can install the exact same software, 
in even the same format on differing operating systems, it would essentially matter less for him or 
her which OS to choose initially. That market would, further, be less locked-in with respect to 
downstream service providers that initially opt for one platform.
268
 The most famous example is the 
one 2,5 billion consumers utilise regularly, if not every day: the internet or data communication that 
is operable across all platforms, devices, et cetera. A more recent example would be the 
standardization of uniform USB chargers for data-enabled mobile phones.
269
 
Search engines work on every web browser software, on every OS platform and most likely on 
any type of computer hardware. Moreover, due to the internet, the engine is reachable from 
practically all over the world and, especially with regard to Google, is translated into numerous 
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languages and respective domains. In essence, one could wonder how much more interoperability 
one could want. However, this is interoperability from one perspective, as in that the engine can be 
operated from anywhere, on essentially any computer device. From a different perspective, however, 
Google has its own index of the WWW, utilises its own search algorithms, and keeps several of the 
factors secret, although publishes many of its algorithm updates online. However, the bottom line is 
that the GOSE market has multiple indices, multiple advertising networks and multiple search 
applications. All of those are generally not interoperable with one another; hence, for both a website 
administrator, an online advertiser, and a search engine user, the choice would matter for the 
respective side of the platform, and therefore, no interoperability exists. 
Nevertheless, on numerous other aspects, Google considers integration and interoperability. For 
instance, on the integration of other pieces of software, it allows documents made by Microsoft 
Word (.doc or .docx) to be converted to Google Doc format and back, allows .mp3 and, for example, 
.pdf files to be played respectively read via with a certain downstream service of Google. Also, on 
the upstream level, several core coding parts of the engine are released as so-called open source, 
allowing anyone with a coding background to tweak or ameliorate the engine, making it a product of 
the public. Many of these precise, down- and upstream interoperability aspects are arguably decisive 
for whether the market or the entities on the market allow for strong interoperability. As of yet, none 
of these aspects are taken into account in an abuse of dominance case. 
IV.3.4.6. Networked innovation. 
The business models that can be witnessed over the last decade consist of market competitors that 
either employ a successful piece of technology or that build a system, platform, or further pieces of 
technology that display strong network effects. They seem to occur foremost on or around the 
previously defined infrastructure of the internet and the WWW. The markets seem to experience 
tipping more and more in favour of increasingly larger undertakings. However, considering the fast 
pace in which all these markets develop themselves, an influential undertaking, today, needs 
innovations in order to expand business or remain large, tomorrow. 
The markets in question have been previously defined, namely as so-called markets of the new 
economy.
270
 One phenomenon extant in these markets is that competition between undertakings is 
not based on the price of a particular product, or on the degree of innovation in a particular strand, 
but on compatibility itself. As described by Jones & Sufrin, “the high technology markets of the new 
economy are characterised by dynamic competition, where the threat to existing products comes 
from new products.”271 Hence, large corporations introduce multiple products or ancillary services, 
which are connected, voluntarily or not, to the existing dominant product. 
For instance, Google Inc. commenced with the employment of a highly successful and profitable 
search algorithm on the World Wide Web. Shortly after, a web browser toolbar was introduced. 
Then, in the following order, several products were introduced, that allowed people to search for 
images, products, or books; an email client was introduced, a picture sharing platform, mapping, and 
an online messenger application.
272
 This allowed the company to not only attract new consumers to 
use these new applications, but also to maintain existing consumers of Google’s search services. 
The example from the case law is Microsoft, which is a more vertically integrated example than 
Google’s. Generally, a purchased piece of OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) computer 
hardware comes with a preinstalled version of the Windows OS, which in turn has a preinstalled 
version of Internet Explorer that might automatically set Bing as a home page that favours its own 
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vertical searching applications. Each level of further vertical integration connects to the former, 
directing flows of customers of one particular level to the other, further downstream level. 
What is more, the potentially further-reinforcing factor of Google’s position as a GOSE is that 
many of the introduced downstream services display network effects themselves. The integration of 
these particular types of software, having network effects, with software that in itself displays 
network effects, might create a further reinforcing effect for undertakings, creating or reinforcing 
dominance. Most downstream examples are messaging and socializing applications such as Google+ 
and Microsoft Skype, email clients such as Gmail or Hotmail, streaming services such as Google 
Play Music, YouTube, sharing platforms such as Picasa for images, and booking platforms such as 
Google’s Products, Hotel Search, Restaurant or Flight Search engines. Further upstream entails the 
Android OS by Google, Microsoft’s Bing search engine, the Chromebook by Google and for 
instance currently the provision of internet access and connection services by Google, Google 
Fiber.
273
 Essentially, it concerns the conjunction of the concept of the New Economy markets with 
the concept of network effects: introducing new products that display strong network effects by 
themselves, in order not only to challenge existing competitors in the particular market of the 
introduced product, but also to reinforce the potentially dominant position on the original product. 
IV.4. Google investigation  
The final paragraphs in this chapter are dedicated to the Google investigation by the European 
Commission. Before the finishing of this article, the EC announced to close the investigation on the 
potential abuse of dominance allegations as committed by Google.
274
 Not much background 
information was, and still is, provided about the Commission’s probe.275 It began with complaints by 
various other (vertical) search service providers, alleging to be unfavourably treated by Google, both 
in the organic and in the sponsored search results.
276
 The investigation was allegedly incited by 
approximately twenty complainants, amongst which Foundem, Fairsearch.org and Microsoft.
277
 
The nature of the investigation foremost revolved around potential abuse of dominance of Google 
Search by deliberately treating competing vertical search service (VSS) providers unfavourably. 
Simultaneously, Google was accused of favouring own specific search services over competing 
search services in the result pages. Allegedly, this was accomplished by lowering the Quality Score 
of the respective competitors.
278
 The mentioned vertical services related to price comparisons (for 
instance, on products, hotels, and flights), which Google had incorporated in the results by ways of 
its Universal Search.
279
 The Commission, furthermore, investigated three other concerns, namely, 
one, the use of third party website content in Google search services (e.g. user reviews or other data) 
without prior authorisation. Two, it researched exclusivity obligations that Google allegedly imposed 
on advertising partners (websites under AdSense), and, three, supposed restrictions for advertisers to 
convey their advertising campaigns from Google AdWords to competing ad networks.
280
 
The procedure followed up until now, is generally referred to as a Commitments Decision 
procedure. In Regulation 1/2003, the rules on implementing (now) Artt. 101 and 102 TFEU are 
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mentioned. The so-called Commitments Decisions that can be issued by the EC are based on Art. 9 
Reg. 1/2003, which states that, where the Commission intends to adopt a termination of infringement 
Decision, as stipulated in Art. 7 Reg. 1/2003, the undertakings under scrutiny can offer commitments 
to adhere to the alleged infringements by the EC, which the EC can document in a Decision. As a 
consequence of the word “intends”, Commitments decisions do not have to find or even give 
evidence for an infringement of competition as respected by Art. 101 or 102 TFEU; all they address 
is the commitments given by undertakings in response to concerns by the Commission that 
competition might be infringed in a particular industry.
281
 Furthermore, no fine is initially imposed, 




With regard to the legal basis of the Commitments procedure, it is relevant to refer to the case 
Alrosa.
283
 In this case, the ECJ explained the relation between Art. 7 and 9 Reg. 1/2003, with regard 
to legal review. Subject of the litigation were proposed commitments by the two largest producers 
and suppliers of diamonds on the world market, Alrosa Company Ltd and De Beers SA.
284
 Alrosa 
pleaded a breach of Art. 9 and of the principle of proportionality, which the GC acknowledged.
285
 
The appeal by the Commission lead to the annulment of the GC’s ruling, in which the ECJ ruled that 
the GC had “encroached on the discretion by the Commission instead of reviewing the lawfulness of 
its assessment.”286 The ECJ stated that the aim of Art. 9 was to address the Commission’s concerns 
after a preliminary assessment.
287
 This is different from Art. 7’s aim of putting an end to an 
established infringement. The EC, therefore, has the legal discretion to ascertain which commitments 
it finds fitting to its concerns.
288
 As regards legal review, the Courts are merely allowed to evaluate 
whether the Commission’s assessment is manifestly incorrect.289 
As an example of the longevity (and perhaps also the complexity) of the Google case, the 
followed procedure currently spans almost four years: the Commission’s investigation opened in 
November 2010, after it had received a number of complaints.
290
 Four concerns as regards Google’s 
practices were uttered by the Commission in May 2012.
291
 Respectively, Google proposed 
commitments and amendments in April and October 2013, and in January 2014.
292
 Currently, a 
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In the following, the contents of the Commitments procedure are covered, preceded by several 
preliminary remarks on the characteristics of the procedure. In the contents section, a comparison is 
drawn between the first solution proposed by Google on the incorporation of rival vertical search 
services in Google’s rankings, and the essential facilities doctrine in EU competition law.  
IV.4.1. Preliminary remarks. 
As these procedures for tackling competition concerns by the Commission not address any legal 
aspects beforehand, such as dominance, from a legal perspective, these decisions would seem to have 
no foundation whatsoever in competition or abuse of dominance law. Any legal hurdle is simply 
overcome by focusing on the effects in the market, the conduct of the undertaking and potentially 
foregone benefit for the consumer. Nevertheless, it is one of the options that the Commission has, 
influenced by a more competition policy-oriented approach. 
It makes perfect sense that competition issues in modern times should be addressed as quickly and 
aptly as possible, and that the Art. 9 decisions are a relatively time-efficient method in order to 
negotiate on competitive conditions and safeguard consumer welfare in a particular industry. 
However, those offered commitments should be based on law, as the Union is founded on the rule of 
law, as Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union prescribes. Where such is completely or largely 
absent, as is in the case of Google’s search algorithm and vertical search services, any Decision taken 
will not provide for legal certainty with regard to the respected undertakings. 
Furthermore, with regard to the timeliness of the intervention, the same conclusion has to be 
drawn that no actual certainty is instated by the Commission. The Google VSS case has taken over 
three years in preparations and negotiations, and the Commitments Decision is yet to be written. As 
many of Google’s adversaries in the procedure will utilise their right to go to Court, or at least have 
expressed their inclination to do so, it will take even more time before actual infringements will be 
uncovered. Hence, no actual certainty exists up until intervention by the Courts, as restricted as they 
may be. Consequently, the approach taken by the Commission, to wit, issuing more Commitments 
Decisions in high-technology or technology-enabled cases and industries with the aim of speeding up 
procedures and restoring competitive balances in markets, might turn out to be more 
counterproductive than beneficial for legal certainty. 
Considering their nature, the commitments procedures might also not contribute to more or 
healthier competition. As acknowledged in Alrosa, companies “consciously accept” that their 
commitments may extend further than what the Commission is able to impose under Art. 7 Reg. 
1/2003.
294
 However, without a thorough legal or economic analysis, market entities that are under 
strong competitive pressures commit to restoring something to which they are not legally bound, let 
alone which is economically proven to be disrupted or even cause of reasonable concern. 
IV.4.2. Contents 
The procedure and the offered commitments have mostly focused on the first issue, which, therefore, 
also forms the centre of attention in this section. With the installation of Google’s Universal Search, 
several algorithmic changes have taken place. Amongst these is the introduction of specific query-
related boxes, that, depending on the query, are incorporated in the search results. The boxes indicate 
the responses of certain Google VSS to the particular query and invite the user to utilise that 
particular Google search service.
295
 
This algorithmic update has had the consequence of prominently offering the utilisation of a 
Google downstream service, favoured over the general search engine optimised results. Competing 
VSS providers have not received these advantages, and, therefore, allege to experience unfair 
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competition with Google’s services. The firm appears not to have decreased the number of search 
results displayed on the first page nor to have altered the manner in which these are displayed.
296
 
Also, competing services could, still, by ways of effective Search Engine Optimization, reach top 
results; however, they opine to have a right to be favourably displayed in the Universal Search 
algorithm and results. Moreover, those rival results should be displayed prominently and distinctly 
from Google’s services, so as to provide a choice for consumers. 
IV.4.2.1. The commitments 
In its Commitments document, Google has provided extensive declarations of the ways in which it 
will change its algorithms, and of its willingness to cooperate as swiftly as possible with the 
European Commission.
297
 As there is little difference between the Commitments of April, of October 
2013 and of January 2014, only the last will be discussed here. Essentially, Google promises to alter 
the design for Google EEA Search domains, effectuating several measures when a query entered in 
the Google General Search Input Feature (the engine) results in the application of so-called Google 
Specialised Results Triggers (the algorithmic response to queries, potentially leading to Google 
Specialised Search Results Pages). 
Google will display its own VSS (more) distinctly from the normal, generalised Search content, 
for instance by using different graphics, and will display them clearly as Google services.
298
 Also, 
where applicable, the firm will clearly advertise and link to alternatives, which it selects and ranks 
differently from its regular advertisement or organic search results ranking.
299
 This counts both for 
desktop as mobile browsing applications.
300




In response to the other claims, Google has proposed an opt-out form for web administrators that 
do not wish Google to crawl any content from their website. This can both be on a full-domain basis, 
or only for a particular sub-domain.
302
 For instance, it would be made possible for online weather 
applications to prevent Google from incorporating their information in its Search Weather 
OneBox.
303
 A similar opt-out is enabled for the product, restaurants, hotels and travel VSS with 
regard to a list of predefined data, by ways of an HTML component that can be incorporated on the 
designated VSS web pages.
304
  
Further, the opt-outs shall not be used in any way to affect the indexation or ranking order of any 
of the web services.
305
 Also, with regard to the other points of accusation, Google will remove 
exclusivity conditions from contracts with AdSense advertisers. This enables website operators to 
also attract advertisements from competing ad networks;
306
 likewise, advertisers are also enabled to 
multi-home with respect to move so-called User Campaign Data to competing ad networks.
307
 A 
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308
 Idem, p. 15-21, pts. 41-71. 
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The Commitments relate only to the mentioned products, hotels, restaurants and flight search 
services. For other VSS, be it for persons (Google+), for mapping services in general (Google Maps), 
for images (Google Image Search) or for many other VSS that Google holds, the Commission has 
regarded either that the services provided by Google are efficient in and of themselves, or are in 
general not urging for the provision of consumer choice.
309
 
IV.4.2.2. Essential facilities doctrine? 
Whereas the previous section covered the contents of the Commitments, addressing the four 
concerns of the Commission, the solution of the granted access to Google’s vertical search service is 
of particular relevance. Especially with regard to assessing the dominance of a player on a market, 
the so-called essential facilities doctrine is often adhered to.
310
 The question, however, is whether or 
not Google possesses an essential facility, let alone whether the firm is obliged to grant access to it.  
This doctrine concerns particular types of abuse of dominance cases, in which a dominant 
undertaking holds a certain facility, be it a distribution or transportation network, or a particular IP 
right. A competitor on a downstream service experiences an obstruction to competition on that 
downstream market, because it is not granted equal access compared to the vertically integrated 
downstream service.
311
 Google is supposedly operating both on an upstream market, in which it 
holds the essential facility for distributing downstream VSS (the GOSE), and on a downstream 




The mentioned claimants and the Commission, under the guise of consumer choice, indirectly 
opine that Google is refusing access to the search engine services. Essentially, however, they  desire 
to be ranked higher, in order to attract more attention to their respective services, without paying for 
it.
313
 Nevertheless, all competitors have access to Google, apart from those who wish not to be 
indexed; what is more, they are indexed for free.
314
 Under normal circumstances, they would have to 
improve their website to an extent that would optimise their search engine listing.
315
 Also, if they 
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Not for nothing, the case law in the EU has brought forward a substantial threshold before 
prohibiting a refusal to supply access to an essential facility.
317
 Access to particular facilities can 
stifle innovation for the undertaking concerned. Also, it can prevent efficiencies from being passed 
down to consumers, as the granting of equal access will cost a monopoly a share of its customers. 
Generally, the conditions are as follows: it has to concern the creation of a new product; the access to 
the facility has to be indispensable (no substitute is available); not having access has to eliminate all 
further competition; and the refusal to supply access is not objectively justifiable.
318
  
In this respect, the Landgericht Hamburg decided recently in a case involving similar facts against 
Google’s Weather OneBox.319 In short, the court decided that the applicant (Verband Deutscher 
Wetterdienstleister) had no grounds for receiving injunctive relief, because Google is to be awarded 
decisional discretion for adapting its engine, in order to make the engine more attractive to 
competing engine users.
320
 Google directly experiences the consequences of any change in its 
algorithm, and withholding a company from innovating as it regards as beneficial for combating the 





The law covering dominance in the European Union is not self-evident. The rules and case law on 
dominant positions remain quite open for interpretation, and as far as clear rules can be derived, for 
novel markets it delivers issues both on market definitions and on dominance analyses. This chapter 
did not essentially strive for incorporating economic theories in competition law analyses. However, 
due to the incompleteness of the law in this respect and the necessity of legal certainty, EU 
competition law as regards dominance has to move and is actually doing so. As such, classic, static, 
methodologies underlying the Commission’s assessments have to be reappraised. 
Irrespective of the irregularities, under current competition law, it is not possible to regard Google 
as dominant in the market for search engines. Network effects might exist on the various sides of 
Google’s network, yet users on all sides multi-home as well. There is no fixed price on Search or on 
crawling, and in a Google auction framework, advertisers decide on the price they are willing to pay 
in order to stay on their respective ad ranks. Moreover, considering the recent case law, there is no 
technical or economic barrier for consumers to switch from service provider. Hence, switching costs 
are low, meaning any consumer is free to choose its provider, a goal to which the EU law enforcers 
strongly adhere. 
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The conclusion on dominance has important implications for the decision on abuse. Legally, an 
establishment of dominance is necessary before assessing the conduct on the market.
322
 A non-
dominant undertaking is, therefore, not capable of infringing Art. 102 TFEU. Nevertheless, by 
stating its concerns in the Commitments procedure, the Commission implies that Google in fact is 
dominant. Furthermore, the inertia of consumers – and the pressure from downstream VSS providers 
– has led the Commission to regard equal access for competitors necessary. The clicking behaviour 
of the majority of consumers on search engines, which does not go beyond the first results page and 
the first clickable item, was the main concern for the EC to instigate these proceedings. Apparently, 
only when a competitor is listed on page one, it will be seen a serious competitor.
323
  
At the time of this writing, the actual final commitments made by Google are not yet disclosed in a 
Commission Decision.
324
 However, at the outset it should be noted that Google provides indexing 
services to all websites for free, hence provides them with the possibility to be found by users which 
are not yet acquainted with the particular service. When Google incorporates information from third 
party web pages in its search boxes, without authorization and without users being directed towards 
the particular pages, this will then account for a loss of traffic of the respective service. Hence, that is 
logical to be addressed, as Google benefits from this.
325
 
In essence, it boils down to an obscured principal-agent issue, in which the Commission and the 
respective entity both seem to have no clear view on the rules. Moreover, the Commission seems to 
have degraded from enforcing principal of competition rules, to an agent that is subject to industry 
interests. In other words, competition procedures have become another possibility by ways of which 
the giants of the internet and software industry can compete with each other. 
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V.  Conclusion 
In little over sixty years, technological developments with regard to computers, internetworking 
and the World Wide Web have drawn considerable consumer and business interest. Complex 
formulas, protocols and algorithms have made it possible for any European citizen with an internet 
connection to search for and to acquire whatever information is available pretty much anywhere in 
the world. The desire to mutually connect and share information has created close to innumerable 
web pages, and various physical and software-based, interconnected networks. Online search, 
forming one of these networks, has not only proven to meet a staggering demand for indexation and 
categorization of online web content, but also to be a fruitful business for connecting people to this 
information. 
Economic theories on multi-sided platforms are still in development; however, a mainstream 
concept of multi-sided markets can be abstracted and applied to online search. By ways of these, 
Google Search successfully performs as a three-sided platform market, mutually drawing consumers 
to websites and to advertisers. The role that network effects play on these platforms is likely to have 
a continuous, perhaps even evolving effect on economic thought, and potentially also on competition 
law thought. 
The research into the law and case law of the European Union on the application of network 
effects and potential dominance has shown that economic theories not necessarily lead the law, as, 
for instance, is shown in the MIF case. This would confirm the Bishop and Walker opinion that not 
every two-sided market should lead to a reappraisal of antitrust assessments. In the case of online 
search, however, it is indicated that classic methodology is not satisfactorily applicable, and should 
therefore change. Still, this indication is based on law that is relatively undeveloped; insofar as 
current law is applicable and definable, Google Inc. cannot be regarded as dominant on the market 
for generalised online search engines. 
Whereas, generally, law enforcement shuts the stable door when the horse has bolted, competition 
law procedures have difficulties in correcting current market processes in a timely manner. Quick 
Art. 102 TFEU procedures are recommended for quickly-evolving markets. By Commission 
prerogative, infringement procedures are seemingly utilised less; instead, Commitments procedures 
have taken their place. However, these are merely subject to marginal judicial review by the Courts, 
as was ruled in Alrosa, and limited legal certainty can, therefore, be derived from the coming Google 
Commitments procedure. In all, not a fully satisfying picture. 
In short, from technological, economic and legal perspectives, the online search market is 
complex to identify and to distinguish from neighbouring, interwoven markets. Consequently, for 
these and similar markets, it requires time, effort and expertise to take all these hurdles. The ultimate 
solution would be a legal model or framework by ways of which competition law enforcing agencies 
could swiftly address the concerns discovered in markets, where both legal and economic theories 
are incorporated. That will be a challenge for the future. 
Consequently, with regard to the main research question, it must be held that the current 
methodological framework, both on defining markets and on assessing dominant positions is 
insufficient for addressing issues in the market/markets for online search. Whether the main research 
question can be answered to full gratification, or what the solution to the problem should be, are 
questions that further research (and more case law) should address. As the case law of EU 
Competition law in this area is rather thin, it would be sensible to pursue a continuing research into 
comparative law of the United States and European Union on this topic. In conclusion, the following 
is evident: the conundrum that Google Incorporated has posed to standing competition law and its 
procedures, is a query that no simple Google search can solve. 
